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Title: Do Managers Respond to Tax Avoidance Incentives by Investing in the Tax 
Function? Evidence from Tax Departments 
 
While prior literature examines the role of incentives in motivating top managers 
to engage in corporate tax avoidance, there is little evidence on the specific actions that 
managers take in response to these incentives. Motivated by the premise that a manager 
can influence a firm’s tax activities by emphasizing the tax function, I investigate 
whether four specific tax avoidance incentives studied in prior literature (financial 
constraints, equity risk incentives, hedge fund interventions, and analyst cash flow 
forecasts) induce managers to make investments in the firm’s tax department. Using a 
dataset of tax employees collected from the website LinkedIn, I find evidence that each 
incentive is significantly associated with an increase in the number of employees within 
the tax department. This association is stronger among higher ranked employees and 
employees with prior tax department experience. In supplementary analyses, I find that 
some incentives also induce managers to pay higher tax fees to the firm’s auditor and 
engage in tax lobbying. Overall, my findings are consistent with the premise that 
managers invest resources in the tax function when incentivized to avoid taxes. My study 
also provides assurance that the association between incentives and effective tax rates 
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A large subset of the tax avoidance literature examines incentives that top managers 
(CEOs and CFOs) have to engage in corporate tax avoidance. The most common empirical 
approach in these studies is to examine the relationship between a specific incentive and 
tax planning outcomes of the firm, such as effective tax rates (ETRs) or book-tax 
differences (BTDs). However, one drawback of this approach is that it provides no 
evidence regarding the specific actions that managers take in response to these incentives1. 
Managers are unlikely to involve themselves directly in developing or implementing tax 
strategies given that they are rarely tax experts. Instead, the literature argues that they have 
a ‘tone at the top’ effect on the firm’s tax activities, which includes emphasizing the tax 
function when allocating resources across different functional areas of the firm (e.g. 
Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010)). Therefore, while prior studies focus on how tax 
avoidance incentives affect outputs of the tax function (e.g. cash tax savings), managers 
will likely respond to these incentives by allocating additional resources to increase inputs 
into the tax function. Empirically, demonstrating a link between tax avoidance incentives 
and tax function inputs will provide stronger evidence regarding the effectiveness of these 
incentives. However, while tax function outputs are observable through publicly available 
financial statements, inputs are more difficult to observe. 
 
1 Note that the word ‘action’ in this context does not refer to the implementation of a specific tax strategy, 
which are likely actions taken by the tax department. Rather, it refers to actions that are within the control 
of top executives who do not have specific knowledge of tax planning, such as investing in the tax 
department or paying auditors for tax services. 
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In this study, I directly examine inputs into the tax function by constructing a panel 
dataset of tax department employees collected from the professional networking website 
LinkedIn. Given widespread usage of the website among professionals, including tax 
accountants, it provides a strong estimate of the number of personnel employed within a 
firm’s tax department. Validation tests using comparisons with tax department surveys 
confirm that LinkedIn is a good data source. I hypothesize that, if tax avoidance incentives 
encourage managers to engage in tax planning, then it should lead to managers distributing 
more resources to the tax function. Since prior studies show that the majority of tax function 
resources are allocated to employing personnel (Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998)), I 
predict that these incentives should lead to an increase in the number of tax personnel 
employed within the tax department. I use my dataset to test this prediction.  
I identify four measures of tax avoidance incentives from the existing literature. 
Prior studies argue that managers with a greater need for additional cash flows will be more 
inclined to pursue tax avoidance activities as a means to reduce tax payments and increase 
the firm’s cash balance. Following this argument, the literature finds that financial 
constraints2 (e.g. Edwards, Schwab and Shevlin (2016)) and analyst cash flow forecasts 
(Ayers, Call and Schwab (2018)) both incentivize managers to engage in tax avoidance in 
order to generate additional cash to finance operations and meet cash flow forecasts 
respectively. In addition, prior literature argues, under the assumption that managers view 
tax avoidance as risky and effort-intensive, that encouraging managers to engage in risky 
activities or exert effort can incentivize them to pursue tax avoidance. With respect to risk, 
 
2 One point of contention is that financially constrained firms may lack the resources to hire additional tax 
personnel, contrary to my prediction. However, Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2015) find that managers of 
financially constrained firms heavily consider cash flow timing when making capital allocation decisions. 
Since the tax function’s outputs (tax savings) are relatively quick compared to long-term investments, 
managers may allocate resources to the tax function when financially constrained, as opposed to divisions 
such as R&D. 
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Rego and Wilson (2012) find that providing managers with equity risk incentives (i.e. stock 
options) is an effective tax avoidance incentive. With respect to effort, Cheng, Huang, Li 
and Stanfield (2012) find that activist hedge funds, through monitoring activities, can 
incentivize managers to exert the necessary effort to engage in tax planning.  
I predict that each of these four factors, if effective as a tax planning incentive, is 
positively associated with tax department investments. To test this prediction, I construct 
a firm-year level measure of corporate tax department size by aggregating all US-based tax 
employees on LinkedIn who disclosed that they were working in the firm during the year 
(although I exclude employees working in a non-income tax role such as sales or property 
taxes). I scale this measure by the total number of employees to create my dependent 
variable for tax department investments, which represents the proportion of employees in 
the firm who work within the tax department3. Using variables to capture each of the four 
aforementioned incentives, I estimate the relationship between each incentive and the 
firm’s tax department investments, controlling for other determinants of tax department 
size and using firm fixed effects so that only within-firm variation is exploited. Details of 
variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
Overall, my main results support my primary hypotheses. First, using one of four 
index measures to capture financial constraints4, and using the CEO or CFO’s portfolio 
‘vega’ to capture equity risk incentives, I find a significantly positive relationship between 
 
3 I choose to scale tax department size by total employees for three reasons: First, it is consistent with prior 
literature (i.e. Chen et al. (2020), Ege, Hepfer, and Robinson (2020)). Second, it allows both the numerator 
and denominator to be denoted in the same unit of measurement, allowing the measure to be interpreted 
easily and preventing confounding factors such as inflation. Finally, there is intuitive appeal in the measure 
conceptually, as it examines how much of the firm’s human capital investments (which are fundamentally 
different than tangible investments) are directed towards the tax function.  
 
4 The financial constraint measures used are: the Altman’s Z-score, the Kaplan and Zingales KZ Index, the 




these two tax avoidance incentives and tax department investments. Next, using a 
difference-in-differences design with firm fixed effects, I also find that firms experience a 
significant increase in tax department investments after a hedge fund intervention or an 
analyst cash flow forecast, relative to control firms. Economic magnitudes vary 
substantially between these four incentives, with the average firm exhibiting a 5% to 20% 
increase in tax department investments depending on the incentive measure. I also find 
evidence that these results are stronger among firms that avoid more cash taxes in response 
to each incentive (see Appendix B). Overall, my results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that managers, in response to tax avoidance incentives, increase the resources allocated to 
human capital investments in the tax function.  
Next, I examine the types of tax employees that managers are most likely to invest 
in when responding to tax avoidance incentives. I hypothesize that employees with a more 
developed tax planning skillset, either through experience or education, are the most 
attractive investments for managers incentivized to engage in tax planning. I find some 
evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Specifically, I find consistent evidence that 
increases in tax department investments are more concentrated among senior-level tax 
employees (e.g. tax managers or executives), as opposed to junior employees (e.g. analysts 
or accountants). Among senior employees, I also find consistent evidence that managers 
are more likely to invest in tax personnel who have prior tax department experience over 
personnel with only accounting firm experience. With respect to education, however, I find 
mixed evidence as to whether managers are more likely to invest in tax personnel who 
possess graduate degrees. 
Finally, in supplementary tests, I examine two other actions that manager may take in 
response to tax avoidance incentives – tax function outsourcing and tax lobbying. Using 
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tax fees paid to the firm’s auditor as a proxy for tax function outsourcing, I find some 
evidence that auditor-provided tax service fees are significantly associated with certain 
incentives (financial constraints and hedge fund interventions), but only in the subset of 
firms that do not have tax departments. This suggests that managers with tax planning 
incentives may turn to tax function outsourcing when they do not have an internal tax 
function. I also find some evidence that the probability that a firm engages in tax lobbying 
is greater when the firm is faced with certain tax avoidance incentives (equity risk 
incentives and analyst cash flow forecasts). Overall, these results indicate that tax 
department hiring is not the only avenue that managers may pursue when incentivized to 
engage in tax avoidance. 
The findings of this study are important for several reasons. First, this study 
contributes to the literature examining tax avoidance incentives. Prior studies often provide 
evidence of the effectiveness of these incentives by showing that it reduces a firm’s 
effective tax rates. However, this raises the question of whether these effects are reflective 
of intentional tax avoidance behavior, particularly in light of recent studies that question 
whether tax rate measures are adequately capturing tax avoidance (e.g. Guenther, Krull and 
Williams (2014), Edwards, Kubata and Shevlin (2018)). My study helps resolve this issue 
by showing that managers engage in a specific action (the employment of tax personnel) 
in response to these incentives. In addition, by highlighting that inputs to the tax function 
are sensitive to managerial incentives, I provide additional evidence of the ‘tone at the top’ 
influence that managers have over the firm’s tax activities. Future studies examining 
whether a certain factor incentivizes managers to engage in tax avoidance may also want 
to consider how that incentive maps into the firm’s tax function inputs, such as the number 
of tax personnel employed. 
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Second, this study contributes to the newly developed literature highlighting the 
role of the tax department within the firm. Despite the tax department being the most 
substantial investment that managers make with respect to taxes, there are few studies 
examining the determinants and consequences of these investments. Some exceptions 
include Chen, Cheng, Chow and Liu (2020), who find that firms with larger tax 
departments engage in more tax avoidance, and Barrios and Gallemore (2018), who find 
that firms hire tax employees when experiencing deteriorations in tax performance and that 
hiring from low-tax firms is associated with greater tax avoidance. By linking this literature 
to four different studies examining tax avoidance incentives, I provide additional evidence 
regarding when managers will make tax department investments.  
Third, this study provides evidence supporting the argument that tax avoidance is a 
costly investment, as managers who are incentivized to avoid taxes will commit capital 
towards employing tax personnel. Prior studies (e.g. McClure (2018)) suggest that there 
are specific non-tax costs and operational frictions imposed by tax avoidance that 
discourage managers from pursuing all possible tax planning opportunities. However, the 
literature has not found substantial evidence that these costs are borne from reputational 
costs (e.g. Gallemore, Maydew and Thornock (2014)) nor increased exposure to risk 
(Guenther, Matsunaga and Williams (2017)). My study highlights that one cost involved 
in tax avoidance is the upfront cost of tax function investment, and this may help explain 
why some managers appear to under-exploit tax planning opportunities5.  
Finally, this study provides some evidence, in a specific setting, on how managers allocate 
firm resources toward different divisions within the firm. Most prior evidence on this 
research question is survey-based (e.g. Graham, Harvey and Puri (2015)) due to a lack of 
 
5 This is commonly termed in the tax literature as the ‘under-sheltering puzzle’. 
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disaggregated data. I provide evidence that managers allocate more resources towards the 
tax department when they have an increased appreciation for the outputs of that department 
(i.e. when they have a greater incentive to engage in tax planning and receive tax savings). 
This can translate to a more general finding that managers allocate more capital towards 






Tax Avoidance Incentives 
Motivated by Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2008), who find considerable variation 
in tax avoidance among US public firms, many tax studies have focused on investigating a 
variety of determinants of corporate tax avoidance. A large subset of this literature 
examines incentives that managers have to engage in tax avoidance activities. Studies find 
that managers requiring additional cash flow for their firms, either due to financial 
constraints (Edwards, Schwab and Shevlin (2016), Law and Mills (2015)) or analyst cash 
flow forecasts (Ayers, Call and Schwab (2018)), avoid more taxes to generate the required 
funds. Studies also find that components of executive compensation are effective 
motivators for risk and effort-averse managers to engage in tax avoidance, including equity 
risk incentives (Rego and Wilson (2012)), after-tax compensation (Gaertner (2014)), and 
labor market incentives (Kubick and Lockhart (2016)). Finally, studies show that other 
stakeholders, including activist hedge funds (Cheng, Huang, Li and Stanfield (2012)) and 
institutional shareholders (Khan, Srinivasan and Tan (2017)), may provide the necessary 
motivation for managers to engage in tax avoidance.  
In the majority of these studies, researchers establish a direct link between a specific 
tax avoidance incentive faced by the manager and a measure representing the firm’s tax 
avoidance outcomes, such as effective tax rates or book-tax differences. However, given 
that managers are rarely tax experts (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2010)), it is unlikely 
that managers with tax avoidance incentives are able to directly influence the firm’s tax 
outcomes through exerting personal effort. Prior literature argues, however, that managers 
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are able to indirectly influence tax outcomes through ‘tone at the top’ effects, including the 
allocation of additional resources to the firm’s tax function (e.g. Dyreng et al. (2010), 
Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie and Graffin (2014), Chi, Huang and Sanchez (2017)). 
Therefore, while prior studies examine the relation between incentives and tax planning 
outcomes, which is an output of the tax function, this relationship is likely driven by the 
manager’s willingness to increase inputs into the firm’s fax function in response to these 
incentives. Motivated by this argument, I investigate the relationship between tax 
avoidance incentives and tax function investments, with a focus on human capital 
investments made within the firm’s tax department. 
Tax Function Investments 
The tax literature often frames corporate tax avoidance as an ‘investment’ (e.g. 
Kubick, Lynch, Mayberry and Omer (2015)), suggesting that a commitment of capital is 
required to engage in tax avoidance activities6. Indeed, prior literature, often using survey 
data, suggests that firms do incur substantial expenditures towards their tax function. For 
example, using a 1992 survey of large U.S. corporations on their tax planning costs, Mills, 
Erickson and Maydew (1998) find that firms on average spend 0.4% of their SG&A costs 
on their tax function, representing approximately $1.2M for the median firm in their 
sample. Similarly, Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) use a 2001 survey of both medium-sized 
and large businesses to find that tax compliance costs increase with respect to firm size, 
with firms over $1B of assets spending on average $1.3M on their tax function. Both 
studies also find that compensation paid to tax personnel represents the most substantial 
 
6 McGuire, Omer and Wilde (2014) find that firms treat their tax sheltering activities as part of their overall 
investment strategy, with investments in tax sheltering being associated with firms’ investment opportunity 
sets, operating uncertainty, and capital market pressure. 
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tax-related expenditure, with 60% to 70% of all tax function spending being allocated to 
personnel costs.  
Prior studies also find that firms obtain substantial returns from tax function 
investment. Mills et al. (1998) find that firms on average obtain $4 of tax savings per $1 
spent on their tax function. Omer, Bedard and Falsetta (2006) show that firms obtain tax 
rate reductions from engaging in auditor-provided tax services, although these effects were 
reduced following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Lynch (2014) find that firms that make 
internal or external tax function investments, in order to remediate tax-related internal 
control weaknesses, exhibit greater tax avoidance in future years. Finally, Chen et al. 
(2020) find that firms with larger corporate tax departments exhibit greater tax avoidance 
and lower tax risk7. Overall, the literature suggests that tax function investments are a 
substantial input into achieving beneficial tax planning outcomes. 
The Relationship between Incentives and Investments 
Given the findings in prior literature that tax function investments yield substantial 
returns, managers who are incentivized to avoid taxes will likely make additional 
investments in the tax function, which should involve employing tax personnel. Practically, 
this can occur if the firm’s current tax department lacks the knowledge and competency 
necessary to develop and implement additional tax strategies, such that further hiring is 
required. For example, a manager may wish to lower the firm’s tax liability through 
multinational tax planning and profit shifting, but current tax employees may not have 
sufficient knowledge of international tax law, tax treaties or transfer pricing. Therefore, the 
manager may need to allocate additional resources to hire a tax director with sufficient 
 
7 In untabulated analyses, I was able to successfully replicate the main results of Chen et al. (2020), 
confirming that larger tax departments are indeed associated with higher levels of tax avoidance. 
11 
 
international tax knowledge. Additionally, the firm’s tax department may not have 
sufficient personnel to manage the additional compliance activities associated with the 
implementation of new tax planning strategies. Activities such as tax-related accounting 
and record-keeping, data collection, and tax return filing are all likely made more complex 
with additional tax planning activities. Firms that become more aggressive in income 
shifting, for example, may need additional personnel to manage transfer pricing 
documentation. Further, IRS scrutiny is likely to increase following an increase in tax 
avoidance, and tax personnel may be required to manage the audit process. 
One implicit assumption made in this study is that, in the absence of specific 
incentives, managers may underinvest in the tax function despite the significant returns it 
provides to the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that if an action is costly to the 
manager but provides net benefits to the firm, managers need incentives to take the action. 
In this context, tax function investments can be costly to a manager in several ways. First, 
there is a direct financial cost, since compensation paid to tax personnel and external 
advisors lowers the firm’s pre-tax income and reduces the manager’s bonus compensation. 
On the other hand, the returns from these investments (in the form of tax payment 
reductions) may not affect the manager’s compensation if: i) the manager is compensated 
using pre-tax, rather than after-tax, income8, or ii) the marginal tax strategies implemented 
are deferral strategies that do not affect the tax expense, and thus will not increase net 
income9. This latter argument is consistent with prior studies showing that managers are 
 
8 Gaertner (2014) find that approximately 40% of firms in his sample compensate the CEO using pre-tax, 
rather than after-tax, income. 
 
9 This argument is also consistent with Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin and Shroff (2014), who find that public 




fixated on GAAP earnings at the expense of shareholder value (e.g. Graham, Harvey and 
Rajgopal (2005)).  
Second, a risk-averse manager may view tax function investments in a similar 
manner to other risky investments, as returns on investment derived from tax planning may 
involve some degree of uncertainty (Rego and Wilson (2012)). Ex ante, managers may not 
be able to predict the amount of incremental tax savings that additional tax function 
spending yields, and may view tax avoidance as an inherently risky activity that they are 
hesitant to commit firm resources to10. If so, then managerial risk aversion models would 
predict that managers view tax function investments as a costly activity, requiring 
additional incentives. Prior literature finds evidence that compensation incentives are 
effective in motivating managers to pursue risky investments (e.g. Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2006), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002)). Analogously, tax avoidance incentives may 
be effective in inducing managers to devote firm resources to the tax function.  
Finally, effort-averse managers may find activities such as the hiring and 
management of tax personnel to be effort-intensive. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) 
investigate managerial preferences in the absence of appropriate governance mechanisms 
and find that managers prefer to live the ‘quiet life’ and avoid difficult decisions and costly 
efforts associated with investments. With respect to employment, they find that managers 
without proper incentives will raise wages to reduce turnover and ‘buy peace’ from 
workers. If employee management is a task that managers prefer to avoid, it follows that 
tax personnel hiring and associated activities such as compensation and performance 
 
10 This is similar to arguments developed in prior tax literature suggesting that managers will forgo tax 
avoidance opportunities due to its inherent risk. However, I argue that the perceived risk involved in tax 
avoidance, in combination with the commitment of capital required to engage in additional tax avoidance, 




evaluation are costly actions for managers. Further, since many tax departments are 
actively involved in the overall business planning process for the firm, managers may want 
to forgo a large tax department in order to avoid unnecessary business interference11. 
Finally, consistent with prior literature showing that managers prefer allocating capital 
towards divisions that they are familiar with (e.g. Ang, Jong, and Poel (2014)), managers 
may inherently be reluctant to invest in the tax function given their limited knowledge of 
taxes12.  
Overall, there is substantial motivation supporting the argument that tax function 
investment is costly for managers, such that tax avoidance incentives can be effective in 
increasing the manager’s willingness to take this costly action. Given the findings in Mills 
et al. (1998) and Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) that the majority of tax-related investments 
are allocated to the employment of tax personnel, my main hypothesis follows: 
H1: Managers will increase investments made in personnel within the tax department 
when provided with tax avoidance incentives. 
There are several reasons, however, to expect that tax avoidance incentives may 
not lead to additional tax department investments.  If managers, on average, do not utilize 
the firm’s existing tax personnel efficiently in generating tax savings, then tax avoidance 
incentives may instead induce managers to change the structure or the incentives of the tax 
department to optimize returns, holding tax department size constant. Managers may, for 
 
11 The 2018 KPMG Tax Department Benchmarking Survey find that 92% of all tax departments are at least 
somewhat involved in the overall business planning and strategy for the firm. 
 
12 This argument is also supported by Graham et al. (2015), who find that managers allocate capital across 
divisions based on NPV rankings as well as their ‘gut feel’. Managers without tax avoidance incentives 
may have an unfavorable view of the tax function’s importance within the firm, and are unlikely to 




example, shift the focus of the tax department from a cost center to a profit center 
(Robinson, Sikes and Weaver (2010)), or change the compensation incentives of the tax 
director (Armstrong, Blouin and Larcker (2011)), in order to better utilize the tax 
department without needing to hire additional personnel. Since hiring personnel imposes a 
direct financial cost on the firm, and can be negatively influenced by frictions within the 
labor market for tax professionals, managers may prefer to pursue these other channels in 
order to facilitate the firm’s tax planning. 
Second, many tax avoidance incentives studied in prior literature are also likely to 
change the marginal costs and benefits of a variety of non-tax investments. Facing limited 
firm resources, managers make trade-offs between different types of investments. For 
example, increases in equity risk incentives may increase the attractiveness of a variety of 
risky projects. To the extent that these projects increase firm risk more so than tax 
avoidance, the manager may divert resources to these other areas instead, as opposed to the 
tax function. Other tax avoidance incentives, notably financial constraints, limit the firm 
resources that the manager has in her discretion. Therefore, while the manager would like 
to increase tax function investments in response to the incentive, there may be insufficient 
funds to do so.  
Finally, managers may increase tax function investments without necessarily 
needing to invest in the tax department. They may instead engage external tax consultants, 
either from their auditor or a third party. Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) find that 
approximately 25% of all tax function spending is allocated to external costs, and Klassen, 
Lisowsky and Mescall (2016) show that 45% of firms in their sample have tax returns that 
are prepared by external parties. This suggests that a non-trivial portion of total tax function 
investments is allocated to external parties. To examine the possibility that managers 
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respond to tax avoidance incentives by engaging tax consultants, as opposed to investing 
in personnel, I examine the relation between tax avoidance incentives and auditor-provided 





DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data and Sample Selection 
I obtain data on corporate tax departments from the professional networking 
website LinkedIn. LinkedIn is the largest professional networking website in the world, 
with over 575 million members and 30 million firms worldwide registered. Employees who 
post their professional resumes on the website disclose information on their current and 
prior work experiences, including job titles, employers, and the time period employed. As 
discussed earlier, prior tax studies use LinkedIn to examine the effect of tax department 
size (Chen et al. (2020)), and hiring from tax avoidant firms (Barrios and Gallemore 
(2018)), on tax planning outcomes13. Using the information provided by tax employees on 
LinkedIn, I construct a firm-year panel dataset of corporate tax department characteristics. 
I begin my data collection process by generating a list of US public corporations on 
Compustat, and searching each of these corporations on LinkedIn to identify tax employees 
with current or prior work experience in the firm. All figures are presented in Appendix C, 
and all tables are presented in Appendix D. Table 1, Panel A provides details on the sample 
selection procedures employed during this process. I begin with a total of 11,694 US-
incorporated public corporations listed in the Compustat database after the year 2000 with 
non-missing total assets over $10M14. Next, I remove firms in the financial services 
 
13 In addition, several accounting studies have also employed LinkedIn data in a variety of settings – such 
as examining the consequences of having employees with prior work experience in the firm’s incumbent 
auditor (Bird, Ho, Li and Ruchti (2017)), and examining whether revolving rating analysts who transition 
from rating agencies to issuers are associated with rating inflation in the issuers’ securities (Jiang, Wang 
and Wang (2018)). 
 
14 I exclude extremely small firms as these firms are unlikely to have a tax department, and firms that only 




industries (SIC codes 6000-6899) following prior literature15, and firms that are 
consistently missing basic financial information on Compustat. Following these 
restrictions, a total of 6,886 firms remain in the sample. Note that, in contrast to prior 
studies using LinkedIn, I do not restrict my data collection to S&P 1500 firms. This is 
important for the purposes of this study, as several tax avoidance incentives (e.g. financial 
constraints) may be more prevalent among smaller firms. 
For each of these firms, I conduct searches on LinkedIn to identify tax employees 
who worked in the firm during each year between 2000 and 2017. I begin my sample in 
2000 as LinkedIn entries are sparse prior to that period, and I end my sample in 2017 to 
mitigate the influence of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) which may cause abnormal 
changes in tax employee hiring in response to the tax reform. I use the firm’s corporate 
legal name, as well as variants of that name, as search inputs during this process. Following 
Chen et al. (2020), I identify a tax employee as a US-based employee16 with the word ‘tax’ 
in their job title. For each employee identified, I extract information on the employee’s job 
title(s) in the firm, their prior work experience, and their educational background. Among 
the 6,886 firms searched, there are a total of 3,311 firms (48%) that have at least one tax 
employee employed in the firm during the sample period. As expected, most firms without 
 
15 In addition, since many financial services firms offer tax services to clients as well (e.g. Gallemore, 
Maydew and Tipper (2018)), it is difficult to distinguish (from the job title alone) a tax employee that 
works in the firm’s internal tax function from a tax employee that works in providing external client 
services. Following this argument, I also exclude firms that offer tax services as part of their business 
model (e.g. H&R Block, ADP, Paychex) 
 
16 This implies that my measure of tax department size excludes tax personnel located in foreign 
subsidiaries. I exclude these employees for two reasons. First, the majority of tax planning related 
activities, such as transfer pricing, is centralized in the headquarters location for most firms (e.g. the 2018 
KPMG Global Tax Department Benchmarking Survey), while regional tax employees primarily focus on 
compliance to foreign tax law. Therefore, foreign tax department size will likely be less sensitive to tax 
avoidance incentives (and more likely to be affected by other confounding factors such as geographical 
expansion). Second, LinkedIn is less prominent in foreign countries, suggesting that foreign tax department 
size will be measured with significant error.  
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tax employees are quite small. Among S&P 1500 firms, only 15% of firms do not have a 
tax department during the sample period.  
To construct my initial sample of firm-year observations, I retain post-2000 
observations from all 6,886 firms regardless of whether the firm has a tax department 
according to LinkedIn. Since my objective is to examine the effect of tax avoidance 
incentives on tax department investments, it is necessary to retain observations from firms 
that do not hire a tax department during the entire sample period, despite being incentivized 
to do so. Excluding these observations would remove firms that choose not to respond to 
tax avoidance incentives by constructing a tax department, thus biasing the sample in favor 
of confirming my hypothesis. In total, there are 65,647 firm-years across all firms in the 
sample, which is reduced to 46,843 observations after removing observations with missing 
data for control variables. Approximately half of these firm-years have at least one tax 
employee working in the firm. This sample size is reduced further in subsequent tests 
depending on the data availability of the incentive variables (when data is only available 
for S&P 1500 firms, the sample size is less than half of the total). 
Table 1, Panel B shows the total number of tax employees present in my sample. A 
total of 39,876 US tax employees were employed in at least one of the 3,311 firms that 
have tax departments during the sample period17. Since my study examines how firms 
respond to incentives to engage in income tax avoidance, I exclude employees who, 
judging from their job titles, are employed solely outside of the income tax function (e.g. 
 
17 A total of 56,882 US tax employees were collected during this process, which was reduced after 
excluding employees in firm-years outside of my final sample.  Note that this is somewhat smaller than 
Barrios and Gallemore (2018)’s initial sample of ~65,000. Two factors contribute to this. First, I exclude 
financial firms (where many tax professionals work) from the analysis since many tax employees in these 
firms actually work on providing external tax services to clients. Second, I exclude non-US tax employees 




sales tax, property tax, and payroll tax employees), leaving me with a total of 31,082 
income tax employees. Finally, based on the job title reported by the employee, I divide 
these employees into three categories (analysts, managers, and executives) based on the 
seniority level of each employee, with the lowest seniority level being an ‘analyst’, and the 
highest being an ‘executive’18. Table 1, Panel B shows, as expected, that the number of 
employees is decreasing in seniority level, with more managers than executives, and more 
analysts than managers. 
Data Validation 
Since LinkedIn membership is voluntary, there may be a significant sample 
selection bias concern since not all tax employees will post their information on the 
website, introducing a potential downward bias with respect to tax department size. In order 
to validate my dataset, I compare my sample data to a tax department survey conducted by 
the Tax Executives Institute (TEI). The TEI surveyed approximately 500 chief tax officers 
internationally during 2011-2012 and report that, on average, there are 10.6 tax employees 
employed in a corporation. Among respondents, approximately 70% of firms have assets 
over $1B. To facilitate a comparison, I restrict my dataset to firms with a tax department 
in 2011 and 2012. Further, since only 60% of firms in my sample have over $1B in assets, 
I exclude the smallest 10% of firms. After constructing a comparative sample, I find an 
average of 9.73 tax employees per firm. Therefore, while there appears to be a slight 
downward bias in tax department size (as expected) due to LinkedIn coverage not being 
 
18 For example, job titles containing the words ‘analyst’, ‘accountant’, ‘specialist’ and ‘associate’ are 
designated as analyst-level employees, job titles containing the words ‘supervisor’, ‘manager’, and 
‘attorney’ are designated as manager-level employees, and job titles containing the words ‘president’, 
‘director’ and ‘counsel’ are designated as executive-level employees. These classifications are consistent 
with Chen et al. (2020). I validate these classifications by examining unusual cases of promotions and 
demotions, and re-classify employees’ seniority levels as appropriate. Employees are classified into one of 
these 3 categories based on the seniority level of the employee when they first joined the firm. 
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completely comprehensive, the discrepancy appears to be minor. The TEI survey also finds 
that 18% (9%) of respondents have 10-25 (over 25) tax employees. In my comparative 
sample, the statistics are very similar, with 18.8% (7.4%) of sample firms in the respective 
categories. Overall, these comparisons suggest that LinkedIn coverage for tax employees 
appears to be fairly comprehensive, with only minor deviations.  
One additional concern is that, since the sample period begins in the year 200019, 
there may be additional selection bias as tax employees in the earlier years of my sample 
may have left the workforce and thus will not have a LinkedIn account. While my research 
design attempts to mitigate these concerns through year fixed effects, I also compare my 
sample to a 2001 corporate taxpayer survey conducted by Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) 
to assess the magnitude of this potential bias. Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) survey a 
sample of corporate taxpayers drawn from corporations under the purview of the Large and 
Mid-Size Business (LMSB) Division of the IRS. Among firms with over $1B of assets, 
they find, on average, that firms spend approximately $1.33M on tax compliance costs and 
60% of these costs (approx. $800,000) are attributed to internal personnel costs. Assuming 
an average of $80,000 per employee20, this represents approximately 10 tax department 
employees per firm. Comparing this to my sample of tax department firms with over $1B 
in assets in 2001, I find an average of 8.77 tax employees. While the discrepancy is larger 
than the 2011 comparison, as expected, it does not appear to be extreme. Nevertheless, to 
 
19 Since my research design incorporates firm fixed effects to exploit within-firm variation in internal tax 
function spending, it is necessary to have a sufficient number of years per firm. Further, certain tax 
avoidance incentives (e.g. hedge fund interventions) are more prevalent in the early/mid 2000s relative to 
more recent periods (e.g. Khurana, Li and Wang (2017)). For these reasons, I do not restrict my sample to 
only the most recent period. 
 
20 The average 2018 salary for a tax manager is $120,000, according to salary.com, which represents 
approximately $80,000 in inflation-adjusted 2001 dollars. 
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the extent that sample selection may bias the results, the results in this study should be 
interpreted with caution21. 
Selection of Tax Avoidance Incentives 
I survey the tax literature for studies that examine specific incentives for managers 
to engage in corporate tax avoidance. My objective is to select a variety of different 
incentives studied in prior literature that motivate managers to focus on the firm’s tax 
function, thereby potentially leading to an increase in tax department investment. I focus 
on published studies which conclude that a specific incentive increases the firm’s level of 
tax avoidance, including studies where the emphasis is on more aggressive forms of tax 
avoidance (e.g. tax sheltering). 
I use two criteria when selecting tax avoidance incentives from prior studies. First, 
I require the incentives data to be publicly available and feasible to collect for a large panel 
dataset of firm-years, which excludes several studies that employ survey methodologies 
(e.g. Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin and Shroff (2014)) and studies that focus on small samples 
(e.g. Gartner (2014)). Second, I require the tax avoidance incentive variable to exhibit 
significant within-firm variation, as my research methodology focuses on how managers 
respond to within-firm changes in incentives22. Following these criteria, I select four tax 
avoidance incentives from four different studies. I briefly discuss each of these studies 
 
21 One additional concern is that some firms without tax employees listed on LinkedIn actually have a tax 
department that do not use the website. To address this, I generate a list of the 30 largest firms in my 
sample without tax employees on LinkedIn, and conduct online searches to gauge whether they have a tax 
department through: i) job postings for tax employees, or ii) salary reports from tax employees on the 
website Glassdoor. With one exception, I find no evidence that these firms have tax departments, 
mitigating this concern. 
 
22 For example, Higgins, Omer and Phillips (2015) find a relation between a firm’s business strategy and its 
tax aggressiveness, arguing that ‘prospector’ firms have greater willingness to undertake the risk and 
uncertainty associated with tax avoidance. A firm’s business strategy, however, is unlikely to change 
significantly over time, and thus it is not a suitable candidate for this study. 
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below, and describe the data and variables used for each of the tax avoidance incentives. 
Detailed variable definitions are provided in appendix A. 
Financial Constraints 
Edwards, Schwab and Shevlin (2016) and Law and Mills (2015) both hypothesize 
that managers of firms that become financially constrained – i.e. firms that experience 
increases in their external financing costs or decreases in their ability to access funding, 
will increase tax planning activities in order to obtain additional internal funds. Consistent 
with expectations, both studies find that firms experiencing increases in financial 
constraints exhibit significant declines in cash effective tax rates (Cash ETR)23. To measure 
financial constraints, I follow Edwards et al. (2016) and use the Altman (1968) Z-score, 
the Kaplan and Zingales (1998) KZ Index, and the Whited and Wu (2006) WW Index24. 
The KZ index and WW index are measures intended to capture firms that experience 
investment-related financial constraints, while the Z-score is designed to capture firms in 
financial distress. All measures are computed using financial statement variables available 
on Compustat. I also follow Law and Mills (2015) and measure financial constraints using 
the percentage of words in the firm’s 10-K that carry a negative tone25. Finally, I combine 
the four constraint measures together into one combined index using Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA), extracting the first component. 
 
 
23 Law and Mills (2015) also find that financially constrained firms report higher UTB reserves and 
increase tax haven usage. 
 
24 Note that Edwards et al. (2016) did not tabulate results for the WW index, but used it as a robustness test. 
 
25 Examples of ‘negative words’ include: loss, limited, adverse, impaired, and against. I thank Bill 
McDonald for providing this data on his website. 
23 
 
CEO/CFO Equity Risk Incentives 
Rego and Wilson (2012) argue that, when provided with equity risk incentives (i.e. 
executive stock options), risk-averse managers are incentivized to make more risky 
decisions in order to maximize their personal wealth. Since the pursuit of aggressive tax 
positions is considered a risky activity for the firm, due to the likelihood of being 
challenged by tax authorities as well as potential reputational costs, the authors predict that 
equity risk incentives will lead to an increase in firms’ tax aggressiveness. They find a 
significant relationship between both CEO and CFO equity risk incentives and various 
empirical proxies for tax aggressiveness. Following Rego and Wilson (2012), I employ a 
measure of equity risk incentives developed in Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002) – 
the ‘portfolio vega’ of the CEO and CFO. This measure computes the sensitivity of the 
CEO’s stock option portfolio value to a 1% increase in the firm’s stock return volatility, 
using the Black-Scholes options pricing model. The inputs to this calculation are available 
in the Execucomp database26.    
Hedge Fund Activism 
Cheng, Huang, Li and Stanfield (2012) examine the relationship between hedge 
fund activism and corporate tax avoidance. They hypothesize that effort-averse managers 
prefer to limit the effort and risk associated with tax planning, and that hedge fund activists 
can, through informed monitoring, incentivize managers to employ tax avoidance 
strategies that enhance firm value. They find evidence that firms exhibit greater levels of 
tax avoidance following an intervention event by a hedge fund activist. To identify hedge 
 
26 I thank Lalitha Naveen for providing the data and computation methodology for the CEO and CFO 
portfolio delta and vega used in Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) on her website. Note that the data she 
provides only extends to 2014. 
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fund activism events in my sample, I begin with the Schedule 13D filings database 
constructed by AuditAnalytics27. Next, I use the Bloomberg database, as well as internet 
searches, to identify whether each 13D filer is a hedge fund28, and use the results to 
determine whether each firm in my sample has been targeted by a hedge fund, as well as 
the first year that the hedge fund intervention began. To make the data collection process 
more manageable, and to allow control variables to be included for executive 
compensation29, I focus only on hedge fund interventions for S&P 1500 firms in this 
analysis. Finally, I separate observations for each hedge fund target firm into a pre and post 
period (split on the first year the firm is targeted by a hedge fund activist) and compare tax 
department investments between the two periods, relative to untreated firms, in a 
difference-in-differences design. 
Analyst Cash Flow Forecasts 
Finally, Ayers, Call and Schwab (2018) examine changes in firms’ tax planning 
behavior after analysts begin issuing cash flow forecasts for the firm. They predict that, 
due to the substantial cash tax savings yielded from tax avoidance, managers of cash flow 
forecast firms will be incentivized to increase tax avoidance activities in order to improve 
the firm’s cash flow health and meet these forecasts. They find substantial reductions in 
firms’ cash tax payments after the initiation of cash flow forecasts. Following this study, I 
 
27 When an investor acquires a 5% or greater stake in a public corporation, they are required to file a 
Schedule 13D form with the SEC within 10 days and declare their intentions to influence the firm and its 
managers.  
 
28 Following Khurana et al. (2018), I only conduct searches on frequent Schedule 13D filers – i.e. activists 
that have launched a minimum of three activism campaigns during my sample period. 
 
29 Since the intentions of hedge fund activists involve influencing management through channels such as 
compensation incentives (e.g. Brav, Jiang and Kim (2010)), it is likely necessary to control for elements of 
executive compensation (i.e. CEO Delta and Vega) in related analyses, which is only available for S&P 
1500 firms in Execucomp.  
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utilize the I/B/E/S detail file database to identify firms with cash flow forecasts issued for 
them, as well as the first year in which analysts began issuing these forecasts for each firm. 
I separate observations for each cash flow forecast firm into a ‘pre-forecast’ and a ‘post-
forecast’ period to analyze the difference in tax department investments, relative to 
untreated firms, between the two periods in a difference-in-differences design30. 
Research Design 
The primary objective of my study is to examine the relationship between 
investments in corporate tax departments and the aforementioned tax avoidance incentives. 
Since the quantity of tax personnel is the most direct proxy in examining tax department 
investments, I construct my dependent variable using the number of income tax function 
employees working in the firm during the year. Next, I scale this variable by the total 
number of employees in the firm (in thousands), so that the resulting measure, 
TAXDEPT_SIZE, represents the proportion of total employees of a firm who are employed 
within the income tax function of the firm’s tax department. I use the number of employees 
as the denominator of choice for three reasons. First, it is consistent with prior literature 
examining tax department investments (i.e. Chen et al. (2020), Ege et al. (2020)). Second, 
it allows both the numerator and denominator to be represented in the same unit of 
measurement (i.e. number of people), preventing measurement issues that may arise if 
scaling by dollars (such as inflation).  
Using TAXDEPT_SIZE as the dependent variable, I estimate the following 
regression model using ordinary least squares (OLS): 
 
30 Since the focus of this analysis is on cash flow forecast firms that were treated during the sample period, 




𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 +  𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼_𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 +
 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 +  𝛽𝛽5𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆_𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 +  𝛽𝛽8𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 +  𝛽𝛽9𝑅𝑅&𝑇𝑇 +
 𝛽𝛽10𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 +  𝛽𝛽11𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆&𝑇𝑇 +  𝛽𝛽13𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 +  𝛽𝛽14𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇_𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 +
𝛽𝛽15𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽17𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼_𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 +
 𝛽𝛽18𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆_𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽19𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼_𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 + 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡            
                                         (1) 
In this regression, I predict that 𝛽𝛽1 > 0 – that managers, when given greater tax 
avoidance incentives, will increase investments made in the tax department. 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 
is one of the four types of variables used to capture a specific tax avoidance incentive. For 
financial constraints and CEO/CFO equity risk incentives, INCENTIVE is measured using 
a financial constraint index, and the portfolio vega of the CEO or CFO, respectively. With 
respect to hedge fund activism (analyst cash flow forecasts), INCENTIVE is replaced with 
an indicator variable equal to one for all firm-years after the firm is first targeted by a hedge 
fund (receives its first cash flow forecast), and zero for all firm-years prior to the respective 
treatment event. For firms that have never received the treatment, INCENTIVE is zero for 
all firm-years. With the addition of firm and year fixed effects, the model effectively 
represents a difference-in-differences research design, where the coefficient of interest 
represents the average change in tax department investments between the pre- and post-
treatment periods for firms after receiving the respective treatment in year t, relative to 
firms that did not receive the treatment in year t (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), 
Armstrong, Balakrishnan and Cohen (2012)).  
Note that, by incorporating firm fixed effects into the model, the analysis only 
exploits within-firm variation in both tax department investments and incentives, thereby 
focusing on how tax function investments respond to a within-firm change in incentives. 
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Year fixed effects are also included to control for time trends in tax department size, as 
well as mitigate potential biases with respect to changes in LinkedIn coverage over time. 
In addition, since the number of tax personnel employed by a firm is a function of 
characteristics not necessarily driven by tax avoidance incentives, such as the complexity 
of tax reporting and the volume of tax-related transactions, it is important to control for a 
number of firm characteristics that are potential determinants of corporate tax department 
size. Therefore, I include a variety of control variables, the majority of which are used in 
Chen et al. (2020). 
Specifically, I include firm size (the logarithm of assets), the number of business 
segments, the pre-tax return on assets, the book-to-market ratio, and firm age to account 
for differences in the tax departments of larger, more mature, more profitable, or higher 
growth firms. I also include leverage, property plant & equipment, research & development 
expenditures, intangible assets, inventory, and SG&A expenses as these characteristics are 
commonly associated with a firm’s tax planning opportunities and are thus likely related 
to the number of tax personnel needed to meet tax planning objectives. I control for the 
firm’s tax status (the existence of, and change in, net operating loss carryforwards (NOLs)) 
to account for possible differences in tax activities between firms with and without NOLs. 
I include variables capturing the scope of a firm’s foreign operations (an indicator variable 
for foreign activity, the amount of foreign income, and the number of tax haven 
subsidiaries), as multinational firms may have larger tax departments. I also include a 
variable capturing the amount of tax fees paid to the firm’s auditor, as tax function 
outsourcing may either substitute for, or complement, investments in tax department 
personnel. Finally, I add a control variable for the number of employees within the firm, 
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Tax Department Characteristics 
Table 2 Panels A to C presents descriptive statistics regarding the distribution of 
tax department size across my sample of US public corporations. On average, firms in my 
sample have 8 US-based tax department employees, which is reduced to 6.4 employees 
after removing individuals who work outside of the income tax function according to their 
job titles. As expected, S&P 1500 firms have larger tax departments on average (10.3 and 
8.25 employees, respectively). Panel B shows that larger firms also have larger tax 
departments, with firms in the highest size quartile having disproportionately large tax 
departments (20 US employees on average). This suggests that the right-skewedness of the 
tax department size distribution is driven by large firms in the sample. Tax department size 
also appears to be evenly distributed across industries (with the exception of the 
telephone/TV industry, which is driven by a few large firms such as Verizon and AT&T). 
Panel C lists the firms that have the largest corporate tax departments in my sample as of 
2016, which includes firms known for having large tax departments such as General 
Electric32 and Amazon. 
In Panels D and E, I also provide some information on individual characteristics of 
tax employees within my sample, separated by seniority rank of the employee. As 
expected, the experience accumulated by tax employees prior to hiring is increasing in 
seniority rank, and the majority of tax employees’ prior experience is accumulated in Big-
 
32 Note that, in 2017, General Electric made an agreement with PwC to transfer the large majority of its tax 
employees over to the accounting firm. This included the move of 275 US-based tax employees, which is 




N accounting firms and corporate tax departments, particularly among tax managers and 
executives. The educational level attained by an employee is also increasing in seniority 
rank, with the majority of tax executives having either a MTax or a law degree. Panel E 
shows that the most common prior employers of tax employees are all large Accounting 
firms, and that the most common universities attended by tax employees offer well-known 
Master’s in Taxation programs33. Finally, Figure 1 displays the most frequent skills that 
tax employees possess, as self-reported on their LinkedIn profiles, which includes a variety 
of tax-specific skills including corporate tax, international tax, and tax accounting.  
Descriptive Statistics – Regression Variables 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression model 
to test my main hypothesis. The dependent variable (TAXDEPT_SIZE) represents the total 
number of income tax function employees in the firm, scaled by total employees (in 
thousands). The mean value of TAXDEPT_SIZE is 0.658 suggesting that, on average, 
0.066% of all employees in a firm work in the income tax function. When excluding firm-
years without tax departments, this increases to 0.128% (i.e. approximately 1 in 780 
employees).  
With respect to the tax avoidance incentive variables, the descriptive statistics for 
the four financial constraints indices and the two equity risk incentive measures are fairly 
similar to prior studies (e.g. Edwards et al. (2016), Law and Mills (2015), Rego and Wilson 
(2012)). For the other two incentives, I find that over 50% of firms have received analyst 
cash flow forecasts during the sample period, consistent with prior literature showing that 
 
33 The top two universities attended (Golden Gate University and DePaul University) are both ranked the 
highest among all MS Tax programs in the United States, according to a survey of corporate tax department 
heads conducted by taxtalent.com. See: https://www.taxtalent.com/mstsurvey/2013_MS_Tax_Report.pdf 
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cash flow forecasts are commonplace in recent years34 (e.g. Mohanram (2014)). On the 
other hand, only about 19% of firms have been targeted by a hedge fund in my sample, 
consistent with the number of hedge fund activism events documented in prior studies (e.g. 
Khurana et al. (2018)) relative to the total number of firms.  Note that the sample sizes 
differ substantially between the incentive measures, as the equity risk incentives and hedge 
fund activism data collection is restricted to S&P 1500 firms.  
Main Results 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating regression model (1), which investigates 
the relationship between TAXDEPT_SIZE and INCENTIVE. Columns (1) to (5) of Panel A 
present the results of the regression using financial constraints as the measure of tax 
avoidance incentives. I standardize each financial constraints index to have a mean of 0 
and a standard deviation of 1 for ease of interpretation. With all four constraint measures, 
as well as the combined index, I find a significantly positive relationship between financial 
constraints and tax department size, suggesting that managers make greater investments in 
the tax department when their firms are financially constrained35. Using the combined 
index, a one-standard deviation in financial constraints is associated with a 0.044 unit 
 
34 Since the cash flow forecast analysis excludes firms that were already treated prior to the sample period 
(i.e. firms that have already received a cash flow forecast before the year 2000), the actual percentage of 
treated firms is substantially higher. 
 
35 These results may be seen as counterintuitive, as it is uncertain how financially constrained firms would 
be able to generate resources to hire additional tax personnel. I argue that, to the extent that managers 
expect returns from tax department investments to be realized quickly (since tax benefits may be realized as 
soon as the next tax year), they may divert resources from other divisions to the tax department when 
financially constrained in order to quickly generate cash. This argument is consistent with Graham et al. 
(2015), who find that managers of financially constrained firms heavily consider cash flow timing when 




increase in TAXDEPT_SIZE, representing a 6.7% increase in tax department investments 
for the average firm36.  
Columns (5) and (6) uses the equity risk incentives of the CEO and CFO, 
respectively, as the measure of tax avoidance incentives. Both variables are standardized. 
In addition to the control variables in model (1), I also control for the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity37 (i.e. the ‘delta’) and the age of the executive similar to Rego and Wilson 
(2012). With both the CEO and CFO, I find a significantly positive relationship between 
their portfolio vega (the sensitivity of their portfolio wealth to firm risk) and tax department 
size, indicating that managers increase tax department investments when given risk-taking 
incentives through equity compensation. A one-standard deviation increase in the CEO’s 
(CFO’s) equity risk incentives is associated with a 5.8% (5.9%) increase in tax department 
investments for the average firm. 
Panel B investigates the change in tax department investments following a hedge 
fund intervention or an analyst cash flow forecast, using a difference-in-differences design 
with untreated firms (i.e. firms not experiencing the event) as the control group. Columns 
1 and 2 replaces INCENTIVE with Post Hedge Fund and Post Cash Flow Forecast 
respectively, which equals to 1 for all firm-years after a firm receives the respective 
treatment. Column 1 shows a significantly positive relationship between tax department 
size and Post Hedge Fund, suggesting that managers increase tax department investments 
after being targeted by a hedge fund. The average firm experiences an increase in tax 
 
36 The mean value of TAXDEPT_SIZE is 0.658, so a 0.044 unit increase corresponds to a 6.7% increase. 
 
37 While I do not make a formal prediction, it is noteworthy that the coefficients on both CEO DELTA and 
CFO DELTA are significantly negative, suggesting that managers make less investments in the tax 
department when their portfolio is more sensitive to the firm’s stock price. This is consistent with Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006), who find a negative relation between incentive compensation and tax sheltering.   
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department investments of 14.6% after the hedge fund intervention, relative to firms that 
do not receive the intervention in the same period. Column 2 also shows a significantly 
positive relationship between tax department size and Post Cash Flow Forecast, indicating 
that managers also increase tax department investments after analysts issue the first cash 
flow forecast for the firm. Relative to untreated firms, the average firm increases tax 
department investments by 21% following the first cash flow forecast that was issued. For 
additional control variables, I include the CEO’s vega and delta in the hedge funds analysis, 
as prior studies show that hedge funds can influence CEO compensation (e.g. Brav, Jiang 
and Kim (2010)). I control for the number of analysts following the firm in the cash flow 
forecast analysis, as the issuance of cash flow forecasts may be accompanied by increased 
analyst following, which can influence tax department investments. 
One concern with the above specification is that, since I use all firms that were not 
subject to the treatment as the control group, the results may be biased if there are 
fundamental differences between the two groups (for example, firms with analyst cash flow 
forecasts are significantly larger and more profitable). To account for this, I employ entropy 
balancing (Hainmueller (2012)) to weigh observations in the control group in order to 
achieve covariate balance with respect to the main control variables38. Observations are 
weighted to achieve balance in the first, second and third moments of the distribution with 
respect to each variable. Intuitively, this creates a control group that is identical to the 
treatment group, in terms of the distribution of observable firm characteristics, with the 
exception that they were not subject to the specific treatment. Columns (3) and (4) repeats 
 
38 These control variables also include year fixed effects and industry fixed effects, such that the treatment 
and control groups are also identical with respect to both industry composition and time period. 
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the analyses using the entropy-balanced sample. Results are qualitatively similar, with a 
reduction in the magnitude of the treatment effect for analyst cash flow forecasts.   
Overall, these results provide support for Hypothesis 1 – that managers respond to 
tax avoidance incentives by increasing investments in the firm’s tax department. Each of 
the four types of incentives are significantly and positively associated with tax department 
investments, after controlling for many other determinants of tax department size and 
focusing only on within-firm variation through firm fixed effects. These results suggest 
that tax avoidance incentives induce managers to focus on the tax function and allocate 
resources towards employing tax personnel. 
In Appendix B, I provide evidence that the tax department effects documented 
above are mostly concentrated among firms who successfully avoid cash taxes in response 
to each incentive. Specifically, after dividing firms into two subsamples based on whether 
the firm’s Cash ETR declines with increases in each incentive, I find that my results are 
consistently stronger in the subsample of firms who exhibit Cash ETR declines. This 
suggests that, on average, the firms who increase tax department investments following an 
incentive are the same firms who ultimately achieve tax savings. Overall, these results 
provide some assurance that the tax department effects documented in this study are indeed 
reflective of tax avoidance behavior. Please see the Appendix for more details. 
Tax Employee Heterogeneity 
While the neo-classical view of the firm suggests that employees are merely 
homogenous inputs into the firm’s production process, many economics studies have 
rejected this view in favor of the theory that employees are heterogeneous and can play a 
role in determining firm productivity (e.g. Black and Lynch (1996), Haltiwanger, Lane and 
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Speltzer (1999)). In this context, employees hired within the tax department accumulate 
different types of work experience and educational backgrounds (see Table 2, Panel D), 
and prior tax studies (Barrios and Gallemore (2018)) suggest that employers of tax 
personnel do consider prior work experience in making hiring decisions. Therefore, the 
types of tax employees that managers employ when provided with tax avoidance incentives 
may vary as well. 
First, I examine whether the increases in tax department investments are 
concentrated among junior or senior tax employees. While junior tax employees (e.g. 
analysts and accountants), due to having relatively few tax planning skills, mainly focus 
on compliance roles such as tax return preparation, data analysis or tax audit assistance, 
senior tax employees (e.g. managers and directors) may play an active role in the firm’s 
tax planning given a more developed skillset39. Therefore, managers may respond to tax 
avoidance incentives by allocating resources towards hiring senior tax employees 
specifically. I examine this possibility by partitioning TAXDEPT_SIZE by seniority and 
estimating two separate regressions for each tax avoidance incentive, replacing the 
dependent variable with the number of junior (senior) tax employees in the first (second) 
regression. I standardize the dependent variables to facilitate a comparison between the 
coefficients of the two regressions. Table 5, Panel A presents the results, which provides 
support for this prediction. With the exception of analyst cash flow forecasts, the 
relationship between tax avoidance incentives and tax department investments is only 
significant when considering the amount of senior tax employees employed within the firm, 
 
39 A search of job descriptions of several job postings for junior and senior tax positions confirms that 
senior tax employees are mainly responsible for tax planning activities, as well as the consequences of 
these activities such as managing IRS tax audits and leading FIN 48 reserve evaluations.  
36 
 
lending support to the theory that managers will hire employees with tax planning 
responsibilities when provided with tax avoidance incentives. 
Within senior tax employees, there is substantial heterogeneity with respect to both 
work experience and education, and managers may respond to tax avoidance incentives by 
hiring employees that are best suited to support tax planning activities given their 
backgrounds. I first examine whether managers have preferences with respect to 
employees’ work experience. Employees who have previously worked in a tax department 
may be more familiar with corporate tax planning relative to employees with public 
accounting experience. This is consistent with prior literature which find that external 
auditors are less aggressive in tax planning than corporate tax departments (Klassen et al. 
(2015)), and that employers prefer hiring directly from a public corporation relative to an 
accounting firm when experiencing deteriorating tax performance (Barrios and Gallemore 
(2018)). Therefore, managers with tax avoidance incentives may prefer hiring employees 
with prior tax department experience. To test this, I estimate two regressions for each 
incentive, using the standardized number of senior tax employees with prior public 
accounting firm experience (tax department experience) as the dependent variable in the 
first (second) regression. I find some support for this prediction in Table 5, Panel B. With 
the exception of analyst cash flow forecasts, tax avoidance incentives are only significantly 
associated with tax department investments for employees with prior tax department 
experience. 
Finally, I examine whether managers have preferences with respect to employee 
education. Specifically, employees with relevant graduate degrees (e.g. an MTax or a Law 
degree) may have developed technical knowledge in corporate tax law through their 
education, and are able to signal technical competence with respect to tax planning in the 
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labor market. Therefore, managers with tax avoidance incentives may hire employees who 
have attained these graduate degrees. I examine this possibility by partitioning 
TAXDEPT_SIZE based on educational background and estimating two regressions for each 
incentive using the number of employees with and without relevant graduate degrees 
(standardized). Table 5, Panel C presents the results of these regressions, which provide 
limited support for this prediction. With respect to financial constraints and equity risk 
incentives, the relationship between tax department investments and tax avoidance 
incentives is larger among employees with graduate degrees. However, the opposite is true 
with hedge fund interventions and analyst cash flow forecasts, contrary to my prediction. 
Figure 2 presents several graphs comparing the coefficients estimated from these 
regressions. These graphs show that, across all incentives, the effects of tax avoidance 
incentives on tax department investments are stronger among senior tax employees as well 
as employees with tax department experience. However, with respect to employees’ 
educational backgrounds, the evidence is more mixed. Overall, there is some support for 
the theory that managers with tax avoidance incentives are more likely to invest in tax 
employees with specific characteristics that facilitate tax planning. 
Incentive Increases and Tax Department Hiring 
In my main analysis, I examine how the total number of tax personnel working in 
a firm is affected by each of the four tax avoidance incentives. One alternative research 
design, however, is to examine whether increases in tax personnel (as opposed to the 
level of personnel) is related to increases in incentives. Specifically, when the firm 
experiences a large increase in tax avoidance incentives during a certain year, is the 
manager more likely to hire a tax employee in that same year? This research design has 
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two benefits relative to my main analysis40. First, it isolates the timing of managerial 
response to each incentive to the year in which the incentive increases, which improves 
identification. This is particularly important for the hedge fund and cash flow forecast 
analysis, since the conclusion in my main analyses is that managers make larger tax 
department investments in the years following the treatment. However, it is unclear 
whether this effect takes place immediately after the treatment or in several years after 
treatment begins (the latter of which may not be actually caused by the treatment itself). 
Second, the dependent variable represents an actual action that managers take when 
incentives increase (i.e. the hiring of a tax employee), which may be a more intuitive 
research design relative to examining the total number of tax employees in the firm. 
To test the prediction that increases in tax avoidance incentives will trigger 
immediate tax department hiring, I estimate the following regression using a conditional 
fixed effects logit model: 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇_𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡             
where HIRED_SENIOR is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm hired a senior tax 
employee (manager or executive) in the year. I focus on senior employees given my prior 
findings that tax department investments are concentrated among tax employees with 
higher seniority. INCENTIVE_SHOCK is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
experienced a large increase in tax avoidance incentives in year t. For hedge funds and cash 
flow forecasts, INCENTIVE_SHOCK is equal to one in the year the firm is first targeted 
 
40 There are also some drawbacks to this research design. First, employee hiring may be accompanied by 
employee departures, such that the total investment in the tax department is unchanged. Second, it only 
exploits increases in the tax avoidance incentive. To the extent that decreases in tax avoidance incentives 
may reduce tax department investments, the research design will not adequately capture this effect.  
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by a hedge fund, or received its first cash flow forecast. This is likely the year in which the 
firm experiences the most significant change in tax avoidance incentives, and the year in 
which managers may be most likely to respond. For financial constraints and equity risk 
incentives, I set INCENTIVE_SHOCK equal to 1 if the firm experienced a change in the 
respective incentive greater than 75% of all firms in the same year.  
I estimate the above regression for each tax avoidance incentive variable, and 
present the results in Table 6. Note that, for this analysis, firms without tax departments (as 
well as firms that hire every year) are excluded since fixed effect logit models require 
variation in the dependent variable within each group. Panel A shows that, in the year that 
firms experience a large increase in financial constraints, the probability of hiring a tax 
employee significantly increases. The results hold with all four financial constraints indices 
as well as the combined index. Depending on the measure used, managers are 6% to 18% 
more likely to hire a senior tax employee during a year with increasing financial 
constraints, relative to baseline years41. I find similar results with equity risk incentives, as 
managers are 7.6% (9.6%) more likely to hire a senior tax employee when the CEO (CFO) 
vega increases. In Panel B, I also find evidence of a significant increase in the probability 
of tax employee hiring in the year the firm is targeted by an activist hedge fund, and in the 
year that the firm receives its first analyst cash flow forecast. A manager is 30% (20%) 
more likely to hire a senior tax employee in the year the firm receives the treatment with 
respect to hedge funds (cash flow forecasts), relative to baseline years. Overall, I find 
strong evidence that increases in tax avoidance incentives can trigger immediate tax 
department hiring. 
 




Finally, I examine how tax department hiring changes in the years prior to, and in 
the years subsequent to, each incentive shock. Unless managers can anticipate future 
economic conditions or forecast stakeholder behavior, I do not expect tax department hiring 
to increase in the years prior to the incentive shock. However, managers may respond to 
tax avoidance incentives with a delay, and thus it is possible that tax department hiring also 
increases in the years following each shock. To test this, I re-estimate the logistic 
regressions in Table 6, but replace INCENTIVE_SHOCK with an indicator variable 
representing an adjacent year. I summarize the coefficients from these regressions in 
several line graphs depicted in Figure 3, where each graph represents the results for a 
specific tax avoidance incentive.  
Overall, these graphs show little evidence that managers increase hiring in any of 
the adjacent years surrounding the four incentive shocks. Each of the four graphs show that 
the probability of tax department hiring exhibits a large spike in the year of the incentive 
shock and does not exhibit similar spikes in any of the surrounding years, with one 
exception for the CEO equity risk incentive in year t-1. These results suggest that the effect 
of incentive shocks in triggering tax department hiring is concentrated in the year of the 
shock. It also provides some assurance that the tax department hiring is actually triggered 









In this chapter, I explore several other actions that managers may take in response 
to tax avoidance incentives. First, I explore whether managers increase the amount of 
services demanded from external tax service providers. Next, I examine whether managers 
invest in tax lobbying activities to achieve favourable tax legislation.  
Tax Function Outsourcing 
While the majority of tax function investments are allocated to internal tax 
personnel (e.g. Mills et al. (1998)), firms also regularly engage in external tax consultants 
for tax planning activities. Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) find that approximately 25% of 
all tax function spending is allocated to external costs. Notably, the firm’s auditor is one 
type of external advisor that many firms utilize for their tax function, also known as 
‘auditor-provided tax services’ (APTS). Klassen et al. (2016) find that 20% of firms in their 
sample file tax returns which are prepared externally by the firm’s auditor. They further 
find that APTS fees are positively related to tax avoidance. Therefore, managers 
incentivized to increase tax avoidance activities may choose to allocate additional 
resources to the firm’s APTS. This may be particularly true for firms that do not have tax 
departments, as the entirety of their tax function is outsourced and the costs of starting a 
tax department may be prohibitively high. 
To test this prediction, I investigate the relationship between the four types of tax 
avoidance incentives and the APTS fees paid by the firm (obtained from AuditAnalytics). 
I re-estimate my main regressions in Table 4, and replace TAXDEPT_SIZE with 
TAX_FEES, representing the natural logarithm of tax fees paid to the firm’s auditor. I 
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estimate the regressions on subsamples of firms with and without tax departments during 
the sample period, as I predict that the effect of incentives on APTS fees is stronger among 
firms that do not have a tax department. I also control for the total fees paid to the auditor 
(including audit fees), as well as the firm’s tax department investments (TAXDEPT_SIZE). 
Table 7 presents the results. 
Overall, there is some limited evidence that APTS fees increase when managers are 
provided with tax avoidance incentives, but only for firms that do not have tax 
departments42. In Panel A, I find some evidence, among firms without tax departments, 
that firms pay significantly higher APTS fees when they are either financially constrained 
or targeted by a hedge fund activist. In Panel B however, I find no evidence of an increase 
in APTS fees for any of the incentives among firms that do have tax departments, 
suggesting that tax avoidance incentives only have an effect on tax function outsourcing 
when firms outsource all of their tax-related activities43.   
Corporate Tax Lobbying 
Prior research suggests that firms spend resources on tax lobbying expenditures in 
order to influence corporate tax policy in a favourable manner. Meade and Li (2015) argue 
that tax lobbying occurs when firms either want to preserve an existing tax benefit 
(‘defensive lobbying’) or to obtain new benefits (‘strategic lobbying’). They also find that 
firms in the latter group achieve lower ETRs after engaging in tax lobbying. Several other 
 
42 Note that the sample size for the non-tax department sample is very small in the equity risk incentive and 
hedge fund regressions due to the sample being restricted to S&P 1500 firms, as the large majority of these 
firms have a tax department during the sample period. 
 
43 Interestingly, firms with tax departments appear to invest less resources in APTS after being financially 
constrained. Combined with the results in table 4, this suggests that firms might substitute tax personnel 
investments for APTS fees when financially constrained. This may explain how financially constrained 
firms obtain resources to invest in the tax department despite a lack of internal funds. 
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studies have also concluded that tax lobbying firms obtain positive tax outcomes relative 
to non-lobbying firms (e.g. Hill, Kubick, Lockhart, Wan (2013), Brown, Drake and 
Wellman (2015), Kim and Zhang (2016)). Therefore, managers may engage in tax lobbying 
as an avenue to manage corporate taxes in response to tax avoidance incentives. This may 
be particularly likely for firms that have already optimized their tax planning activities 
given existing tax legislation, such that the only avenue to further reduce taxes would be 
to influence the tax legislation itself. 
To test my prediction, I first collect tax lobbying data from the public database 
maintained by the Centre for Responsive Politics44. For each firm-year in my sample, I use 
the database to determine whether the firm incurred any lobbying expenditures relating to 
tax issues specifically. Next, I re-estimate my main regressions in Table 4, but replace the 
dependent variable with LOBBY(0/1), an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm engaged 
in tax lobbying during the year. This creates a linear probability model where I examine 
whether each incentive significantly increases the probability of tax lobbying. Since tax 
lobbying is relatively sticky over time (i.e. tax lobbying firms tend to incur lobbying 
expenditures every year), I replace firm fixed effects with industry fixed effects (using the 
Fama French 48 classification system) to capture the variation in tax lobbying across 
firms45. Table 8 presents the results. 
Overall, I find some evidence that tax avoidance incentives increase the probability 
that a firm will engage in tax lobbying. I find a significant and positive association between 
tax lobbying and equity risk incentives for both the CEO and CFO, with the probability 
 
44 The data can be obtained in https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying. 
 
45 For hedge fund interventions and analyst cash flow forecasts, I also include a treatment firm indicator (as 
a substitute for firm fixed effects) to adopt a generalized difference-in-differences model. 
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increasing by 3.2% (4.0%) for a one standard deviation increase in the CEO (CFO) vega. 
I also find that firms are significantly more likely (by 1.5%) to engage in tax lobbying after 
receiving an analyst cash flow forecast, relative to untreated firms. I do not, however, find 
any evidence that the other two tax avoidance incentives (financial constraints and hedge 
fund interventions) affect a firm’s propensity to lobby on tax issues. For financial 
constraints, this may be explained by financially constrained firms having limited resources 
to invest in lobbying.   
Additional Robustness Tests 
I conduct several untabulated robustness tests to mitigate potential concerns with 
my empirical specification. First, I examine whether my results hold with alternative 
scalars for my dependent variable (as opposed to the total number of employees). I re-
estimate my main regressions using total assets as the denominator of choice. With the 
exception of one specific financial constraints index (the Altman’s Z-Score), my results are 
robust to this specification. I also find that my results are robust to using the logarithm of 
tax department size as my dependent variable, as opposed to scaling it. 
Next, I address the possibility that my results may be driven by the fact that tax 
department size is increasing over time. While year fixed effects mitigate this concern, it 
is possible that larger firms experience greater increases in tax personnel over time relative 
to the average, which may bias my results. To address this, I re-estimate my regressions by 
interacting each year fixed effect with indicator variables representing which size decile 
(measured using assets) the firm belongs to, creating a set of separate year dummies for 
firms in each size decile. This allows the time trend in tax department size to vary for 
smaller vs. larger firms. My results are robust to this alternative specification.  
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Finally, I re-estimate my regressions using a Fixed-Effect Poisson (FEP) regression 
model, as opposed to OLS. One potential concern with the use of OLS in my main analyses 
is that, since the number of tax employees is a discrete variable taking on integer values 
only, a count data regression model (using the unscaled number of employees as the 
dependent variable) may be more appropriate than an OLS model (e.g. Rock, Sedo and 
Willenborg (2001)). The FEP model is appropriate for analyzing count data and is very 
robust to distributional assumptions46. I find that all my results are robust to using the FEP 
model, as opposed to OLS. 
  
 
46 Wooldridge (1999) shows that the FEP model, when estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood 
estimator (QMLE), provides consistent estimates even when the underlying distribution is not Poisson, and 
only the conditional mean assumption needs to hold. Further, robust standard errors can be computed which 





In this study, I examine whether managers respond to tax avoidance incentives by 
increasing investments made in the firm’s tax department. Using four types of incentives 
examined in prior literature – financial constraints, equity risk incentives, hedge fund 
interventions and analyst cash flow forecasts, and employing a novel dataset of tax 
department employees collected from the professional networking website LinkedIn, I find 
that the number of tax personnel employed by the firm increases with each of the four 
incentives. This suggests that managers, in response to various tax avoidance incentives, 
allocate resources to employing human capital within the tax department. My results are 
consistent with prior literature suggesting that managerial influence over firm tax planning 
is limited to ‘tone at the top’ effects, such as their ability to invest resources into the tax 
function.  
Overall, my study complements prior literature examining these tax avoidance 
incentives by highlighting how inputs of the tax function are affected by these incentives, 
in contrast with prior studies that only focus on outputs of the tax function (i.e. tax savings). 
The intuitive appeal of this approach is that it directly links these incentives with a specific 
managerial action (i.e. tax department hiring), rather than the outcomes of these actions. 
The common definition of an ‘incentive’ involves the incitement of action and effort. 
However, since tax avoidance is not an area that managers generally specialize in, it is 
unlikely that managers exert effort personally in the development and execution of tax 
strategies. The results of my study suggest that the ‘action and effort’ incited by these 
incentives may be observable through an increase in the amount of resources invested in 
the tax department by the manager. Future researchers examining tax avoidance incentives 
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may wish to strengthen their results by demonstrating, in conjunction with improved tax 















TAXDEPT_SIZE The total number of employees working in the firm with the 
word ‘tax’ in the job title, less employees that work in a non-
income tax area (e.g. sales and property tax), scaled by total 
employees (EMP). Source: LinkedIn 
 
Altman Z-Score Measure of financial distress introduced in Altman (1968), 
computed as:     -----------
1*{3.3*[(PI+XINT)/AT]+1.2*(WCAP/AT) 
+(SALE/AT) +1.4*(RE/AT) +0.6*[(CSHO*PRCC_F)/LT]} 
 
 
KZ Index The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) financial constraints index, 





WW Index The Whited and Wu (2006) financial constraints index, 
computed as:  0.091*(IB+DP)/AT - 0.062*(Dividend Dummy) 
+0.021*DLTT/AT - 0.044*Ln(AT) + 0.102*(Average Industry 
Sales Growth) - 0.035*(Sales Growth) 
 
Textual Textual analysis measure of financial constraints used in Law 
and Mills (2015), computed as the number of negative words 
divided by the total number of words in the 10-K. Examples 
include: loss, against, limitation, impairment and adverse. 
  
Combined Index The first component extracted from a principal components 
analysis of Altman Z-Score, KZ Index, WW Index, and Textual. 
 
CEO (CFO) Vega The change in the option portfolio value of the CEO (CFO) for 
a 1% change in the stock return volatility of the firm. See Core 
and Guay (2002). Source: Execucomp 
 
Post Hedge Fund An indicator variable equal to 1 for all firm-years after a firm 
is first targeted by a hedge fund, and 0 for firm-years prior to 
the hedge fund invention, as well as for firms that have never 
been targeted by a hedge fund. Source: AuditAnalytics 
 
Post Cash Flow 
Forecast 
An indicator variable equal to 1 for all firm-years after a firm 
receives its first cash flow forecast from an analyst, and 0 for 
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firm-years prior to the first forecast, as well as for firms that 




SIZE The natural logarithm of assets (AT) 
 
LN_SEGMENTS The natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of business 
segments in the firm. 
 
ROA Pre-tax income (PI) divided by lagged assets (AT) 
 
BTM Book value of common equity (CEQ) divided by market value 
of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F) 
 
FIRM_AGE The natural logarithm of the current fiscal year (FYEAR) 
minus the first fiscal year that the firm is in Compustat 
 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt (DLTT + DLC), divided by assets (AT). 
 
PPE Net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) divided by assets 
(AT) 
 
RD R&D expenditures (XRD) divided by lagged assets (AT).  
 
INTANG Intangible assets (INTAN) divided by assets (AT) 
 
INVENTORY Inventory (INVT) divided by assets (AT) 
 
NOL Indicator variable equal to 1 if tax-loss carryforwards (TLCF) 
are greater than 0. 
 
CHANGE_NOL Change in tax-loss carryforwards (TLCF) divided by lagged 
assets 
 
FOR_DUMMY Indicator variable equal to 1 if foreign pre-tax income, tax 
expense or deferred tax expense (PIFO, TXFO, TXDFO) is 
greater than 0. 
 
FOR_INCOME Foreign pretax income (PIFO) divided by lagged assets (AT) 
 
LN_HAVENS The natural logarithm of one plus the number of tax haven 
subsidiaries that the firm is present in. Source: Scott Dyreng’s 
Ex. 21 dataset 
 
TAX_FEES The natural logarithm of 1 + tax fees paid to the auditor, in 
thousands. Source: AuditAnalytics 
 
LN_EMPLOYEES Natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm 
(EMP) 
 
SG&A Selling, general & admin expenses (XSGA), divided by lagged 
assets 
 
CEO (CFO) DELTA The change in the portfolio value of the CEO (CFO) for a 1% 





CEO (CFO) AGE Age of the CEO (CFO). 
 





NUM JUNIOR (NUM 
SENIOR) 
Number of tax employees on LinkedIn with an analyst-level 
(manager or executive-level) job title, scaled by EMP. Junior 
job titles include: analyst, accountant and specialist. Senior job 
titles include: manager, director, and counsel. 
 
NUM PUBLIC ACCT 
(NUM TAX DEPT) 
Number of senior tax employees on LinkedIn with experience 
in a public accounting firm (tax department) prior to hire, 
scaled by EMP. NUM PUBLIC ACCT excludes employees 
who also have tax department experience. Public accounting 
experience is identified as having a public accounting firm as 
the job location (identified through internet searches). Tax 
department experience is identified by having ‘tax’ in the job 
title, and a corporation as the job location (identified through 
internet searches). 
 
NUM GRAD (NUM 
NO GRAD) 
Number of senior tax employees on LinkedIn with (without) a 
relevant graduate degree (e.g. MAcc, MTAX, JD or LLM), 
scaled by EMP 
 
HIRED_SENIOR Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm hired a senior tax 
employee during the year 
 
INCENTIVE_SHOCK For financial constraints and equity risk incentives, an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm experienced an increase 
in the respective incentive variable in the top 25th percentile of 
all changes in the year. For hedge funds (cash flow forecasts), 
an indicator variable equal to 1 in the year that the firm is 
targeted by a hedge fund (receives a cash flow forecast for the 
first time). 
 
TOTAL_FEES The logarithm of total fees paid to the auditor (TOTAL_FEES)  
 
LOBBY(0/1) Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm incurred lobbying 







DIFFERENTIAL TAX DEPARTMENT EFFECTS  
To provide evidence that my main results are driven by firms avoiding taxes in 
response to each incentive, I partition my sample into two similar-sized groups based on 
whether the firm reduced their tax liability after experiencing increases in each incentive. 
My results, if indeed reflective of tax avoidance, should be concentrated in the group of 
firms that actually avoid taxes when these incentives increase.  
Beginning with financial constraints, I compute, for each firm, an intra-firm 
correlation (using the Pearson correlation coefficient) between the firm’s annual Cash ETR 
and the financial constraint measure. Next, I separate all firms in the sample into two 
groups, split on the median value of the correlation coefficient. Firms with below-median 
correlations – i.e. firms that experience larger decreases in taxes paid as their financial 
constraints increase, are classified as ‘tax avoiders’ for the purpose of this analysis. I do 
this separately for each financial constraint measure, and then repeat my main analyses on 
the two subsamples formed. My results, presented in Table 9 Panel A, show that the tax 
department effects are stronger among the subsample of tax avoiders. With the exception 
of the KZ index, the relationship between each financial constraint index and tax 
department investments is stronger among the group of firms that experience larger 
reductions in Cash ETR as they become more financially constrained. Using the combined 
index, the magnitude of the effect is approximately 2.6 times larger in the ‘tax avoiders’ 
subsample. 
For the equity risk incentives, I repeat the above procedure for both the CEO and 
CFO vega, except that I use the Discretionary Permanent Book-Tax Differences (DTAX) 
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measure developed in Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009) as opposed to the Cash ETR measure. 
Since equity risk compensation incentivizes managers to engage in more aggressive tax 
reporting (Rego and Wilson (2012)), as opposed to all forms of tax avoidance, the DTAX 
measure better captures this effect. Firms with higher within-firm correlations between 
DTAX and the CEO or CFO vega are classified as ‘tax avoiders’ as these firms become 
more tax aggressive in response to increases in equity risk incentives. Panel B shows that 
the tax department effects are indeed more concentrated in the tax avoiders subsample, 
particularly for the CFO incentive.  
Finally, for hedge funds and analyst cash flow forecasts, I divide the treatment firms into 
two groups based on the change in the firm’s average Cash ETR following the treatment 
event47. Firms that experience greater declines in Cash ETR after receiving the hedge fund 
intervention (analyst cash flow forecast) are classified as ‘tax avoiders’ while the other 
treatment firms are classified as ‘non-tax avoiders’. Next, I conduct two separate 
regressions, classifying tax avoiders and non-tax avoiders as the treatment firms, 
respectively. Panel C shows that the tax department effects are significantly greater when 
tax avoiders are used as the treatment group – firms that avoid more taxes after being 
targeted by an activist hedge fund also invest more in tax departments following the event. 
Panel D shows similar inferences with analyst cash flow forecasts – firms that avoid more 
taxes after receiving an analyst cash flow forecast also experience larger increases in tax 
department investments.
 
47 I first compute the firm’s average Cash ETR for all years in the sample prior to the treatment event, and 
the firm’s average Cash ETR for all years following the event (including the treatment year itself). I use the 





FIGURE 1: Reported Skillset by Tax Employees 
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Effect of Incentives on Tax Dept vs. Accounting Firm 
Employee Investment
Effect on Tax Department Employee Investment Effect on Accounting Firm Employee Investment
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Employee Investment
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FIGURE 3: Effect of Tax Avoidance Incentive Shocks on Probability of Tax Department Hiring 
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TABLE 1: Sample Selection 
Panel A: Sample Selection of Firms 
 Firms 
 
Number of US-incorporated firms in Compustat after the year 
2000 with non-missing assets over $10M 
 
11,694 
    Less: Financial firms (SIC 6000-6899) (2,658) 
 
    Less: Firm with consistently missing Compustat data 
 
(2,150) 
Total number of firms searched on the LinkedIn website 
 
6,886 
Number of Firms with Tax Employees: 






Total Number of Firm-Years: 
    
Less: Firm-Years with missing financial data on Compustat: 
 
Number of Observations in Sample: 
 
Number of Firm-Years with Tax Employees: 


















48 Note that the final number of observations in each regression will be dependent on the data availability of 
the tax avoidance incentive variable. Analyses involving incentive data that is only collected for S&P 1500 




TABLE 1: Sample Selection 








 Number of firm-
employees           
 
Total number of tax employees based in the United States and 
employed in a sample firm-year 
 
39,876 
    Less: Employees who did not work in the income tax 




Number of Income Tax Employees: 
 
Number of Analysts: 
Number of Managers: 








TABLE 2: Corporate Tax Department Characteristics 
Panel A: Average Tax Department Size (# of US-Based Employees) 
 N Mean Q25 Q50 Q75 
All Firm-Years with Tax Departments     
US Tax Department Size (all 
functions) 
23,837 7.97 2 4 8 
US Tax Department Size (income tax 
only) 
23,837 6.44 1 3 7 
 
S&P 1500 Firm-Years with Tax Departments     
US Tax Department Size (all 
functions) 
15,096 10.31 2 5 11 
US Tax Department Size (income tax 
only) 
15,096 8.25 2 4 8 
 
Panel B: Tax Department Size by Firm Size and Industry 
Size Quartile (Total 
Assets) 
N Mean Q25 Q50 Q75 
1 5,960 2.12 1 1 3 
2 5,959 3.57 2 3 5 
3 5,959 6.05 3 5 8 
4 5,959 20.13 7 13 24 
 
Industry (Fama French 12 
Classification) 
N Mean Q25 Q50 Q75 
Consumer Non-Durables (Food 
etc.) 
1,731 7.44 2 4 9 
Consumer Durables (Cars, TVs, 
etc.) 
893 6.37 2 4 6 
Manufacturing 3,588 6.49 2 4 7.5 
Oil, Gas and Coal 1,256 9.93 2 4 10 
Chemicals and Allied Products 963 8.46 2 5 12 
Business Equipment (Computers 
etc.) 
5,454 7.31 1 3 7 
Telephone and TV Transmission 892 16.49 2 4 14 
Wholesale, Retail and Services 3,829 8.84 2 4 10 
Healthcare and Medical 
Equipment 
1,744 7.37 1 3 8 






TABLE 2: Corporate Tax Department Characteristics  








































TABLE 2: Corporate Tax Department Characteristics 







 N = 14,430 N = 9,435 N = 7,217 
Prior Work Experience (Before Joining 
Firm): 
   
Average Number of Years Worked: 4.61 9.96 14.24 
   As a Manager: 0.61 4.67 6.55 
   As an Executive: 0.04 0.66 5.01 
% of Employees with Experience in    
   Big N Accounting Firm: 25.6% 65.7% 77.4% 
   Non-BigN Accounting/Consulting Firm: 22.8% 27.3% 17.7% 
   Financial Institution: 11.6% 14.1% 14.4% 
   Law Firm: 1.8% 4.6% 11.3% 
   Government Agency (e.g. IRS): 2.5% 3.5% 3.6% 
   Public Corporation (Tax Department): 22.1% 41.9% 52.9% 
   Private Corporation (Tax Department): 9.1% 17.6% 21.9% 
Educational Background    
% of Employees whose Highest Attained 
Education is:    
   Undergraduate Degree: 46.6% 32.7% 22.1% 
   Undergraduate in Accounting: 35.9% 28.1% 20.0% 
   Graduate Degree: 52.3% 66.9% 77.5% 
   MTax or MAcc with Tax Specialization: 20.4% 36.5% 37.6% 
   Other MAcc: 18.3% 13.5% 9.0% 
   Law Degree (JB or LLM): 3.2% 10.9% 27.9% 
   Attended a Top 20 Business School49: 4.8% 11.0% 20.8% 
Other Characteristics    
Average Age (while employed in 
company): 32.4 38.4 43.9 
Gender (% Female): 47.6% 39.5% 25.8% 













TABLE 2: Corporate Tax Department Characteristics 
Panel E: Most Frequent Employers and Educational Institutions 




































Golden Gate University 
DePaul University 
Univ. of Texas at Austin 
New York University 
University of Washington 
Bentley University 












TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics: Regression Variables 
Panel A: Main and Control Variables 
 N Mean SD Q25 Q50 Q75 
Main Variables       
TAXDEPT_SIZE 46,843 0.658 1.401 0.000 0.046 0.678 
Financial Constraints:       
   Altman Z-Score 42,450 -3.981 5.138 -5.109 -3.136 -1.693 
   KZ Index 44,385 -8.836 28.063 -6.454 -1.191 0.850 
   WW Index 46,416 -0.274 0.106 -0.348 -0.271 -0.197 
   Textual 38,385 0.016 0.004 0.014 0.016 0.019 
   Combined Index 32,700 -0.078 0.816 -0.550 -0.078 0.398 
Equity Risk Incentives:       
   CEO Vega ($M) 16,269 0.137 0.217 0.015 0.054 0.157 
   CFO Vega ($M) 12,628 0.034 0.055 0.004 0.014 0.038 
Analyst Cash Flow 
Forecasts: 
      
   Post Cash Flow 
Forecast  
40,073 0.433 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 
    % of Firms Treated 
Hedge Fund 
Intervention: 
40,073 50.6%     
   Post Hedge Fund  16,617 0.119 0.324 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    % of Firms Treated 16,617 18.5%     
Control Variables       
SIZE 46,843 6.065 1.952 4.583 6.003 7.422 
LN_SEGMENTS 46,843 1.080 0.433 0.693 0.693 1.386 
ROA 46,843 0.029 0.191 -0.028 0.053 0.123 
BTM 46,843 0.569 0.984 0.256 0.468 0.794 
FIRM_AGE 46,843 18.335 11.366 9.000 16.000 28.000 
LEVERAGE 46,843 0.222 0.221 0.017 0.180 0.344 
PPE 46,843 0.248 0.223 0.076 0.174 0.353 
R&D 46,843 0.041 0.075 0.000 0.000 0.052 
INTANG 46,843 0.178 0.195 0.011 0.106 0.290 
INVENTORY 46,843 0.127 0.139 0.010 0.088 0.191 
NOL 46,843 0.499 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CHANGE_NOL 46,843 0.035 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.009 
FOR_DUMMY 46,843 0.598 0.490 0.000 1.000 1.000 
FOR_INCOME 46,843 0.012 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.014 
LN_HAVENS 46,843 0.640 0.979 0.000 0.000 1.099 
TAX_FEES 46,843 2.844 2.637 0.000 3.135 5.100 
LN_EMPLOYEES 46,843 0.458 1.983 -0.997 0.464 1.859 








 N Mean SD Q25 Q50 Q75 
CEO_DELTA ($M) 16,269 0.619 1.322 0.081 0.211 0.565 
CEO_AGE 16,269 55.386 7.113 50.000 55.000 60.000 
CFO_DELTA ($M) 12,628 0.082 0.122 0.015 0.039 0.093 
CFO_AGE 12,628 50.330 6.504 46.000 50.000 55.000 
LN_ANALYSTS 46,843 1.850 1.187 0.693 2.079 2.773 
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TABLE 3: Descriptive Statistics: Regression Variables 
Panel B: Additional Variables 
  
 N Mean SD Q25 Q50 Q75 
Variables in Additional 
Tests 
      
Table 5:       
NUM JUNIOR 46,843 0.189 0.519 0.000 0.000 0.118 
NUM SENIOR 46,843 0.440 0.955 0.000 0.000 0.426 
NUM PUBLIC ACCT 46,843 0.115 0.352 0.000 0.000 0.024 
NUM TAX DEPT 46,843 0.210 0.552 0.000 0.000 0.116 
NUM GRAD 46,843 0.251 0.618 0.000 0.000 0.187 
NUM NO GRAD 
 
46,843 0.170 0.485 0.000 0.000 0.088 
Table 6:       
HIRED_SENIOR 25,723 0.286 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Hedge Fund Initiation 12,853 0.023 0.149 0.000 0.000 0.000 
First CF Forecast 
 
20,085 0.062 0.241 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 7:       
TOTAL_FEES 42,740 13.614 1.437 12.626 13.651 14.537 
       
Table 8:       
LOBBY(0/1) 46,843 0.074 0.262 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE 4: The Relationship Between Tax Avoidance Incentives and Tax Department Investments 
 
Panel A: Financial Constraints and Equity Risk Incentives 
 
 Financial Constraint Indices Equity Risk Incentives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
INCENTIVE = Altman Z-Score KZ Index WW Index Textual Combined CEO Vega CFO Vega 
        
INCENTIVE 0.025** 0.029*** 0.035* 0.014** 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.039** 
 (1.894) (2.616) (1.431) (1.666) (3.410) (2.713) (2.408) 
SIZE 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.202*** 0.176*** 0.213*** 0.240*** 0.269*** 
 (4.617) (4.927) (4.816) (3.734) (4.200) (3.178) (2.999) 
LN_SEGMENTS -0.098*** -0.081** -0.074** -0.052 -0.073* -0.108** -0.124** 
 (-2.610) (-2.023) (-1.969) (-1.341) (-1.772) (-2.074) (-2.087) 
ROA -0.029 -0.072 -0.096* -0.136** -0.039 -0.209 -0.192 
 (-0.471) (-1.301) (-1.680) (-2.323) (-0.541) (-1.416) (-1.062) 
BTM -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.009 -0.028 -0.007 
 (-1.099) (-0.607) (-0.476) (-0.727) (-1.233) (-1.254) (-0.300) 
FIRM_AGE 0.017 0.025** 0.024** 0.038*** 0.029* 0.110*** 0.092*** 
 (1.567) (2.260) (2.237) (2.675) (1.892) (4.180) (3.836) 
LEVERAGE 0.020 0.088 0.082 0.052 -0.059 -0.159 -0.143 
 (0.297) (1.324) (1.241) (0.686) (-0.807) (-1.201) (-1.182) 
PPE 0.347** 0.332** 0.382*** 0.278* 0.392** 0.416* 0.338 
 (2.226) (2.260) (2.684) (1.674) (2.319) (1.799) (1.357) 
RD -0.757*** -0.968*** -0.926*** -0.928*** -0.960*** -0.671 -0.637 
 (-3.194) (-4.041) (-3.928) (-3.503) (-3.472) (-1.466) (-1.228) 
INTANG -0.213** -0.166** -0.123 -0.163* -0.152 -0.093 -0.164 
 (-2.552) (-1.971) (-1.523) (-1.732) (-1.625) (-0.733) (-1.144) 
INVENTORY -0.009 0.044 -0.031 -0.013 0.053 0.084 0.386 
 (-0.050) (0.263) (-0.178) (-0.066) (0.277) (0.239) (1.019) 
NOL 0.041** 0.034* 0.030 0.024 0.032* 0.016 -0.003 
 (2.216) (1.803) (1.631) (1.232) (1.705) (0.596) (-0.096) 
CHANGE_NOL -0.029 -0.005 -0.021 -0.047 -0.065** -0.101 -0.131* 
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TABLE 4, Panel A (Continued) 
 
 Financial Constraint Indices Equity Risk Incentives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
INCENTIVE = Altman Z-Score KZ Index WW Index Textual Combined CEO Vega CFO Vega 
 (-0.986) (-0.177) (-0.721) (-1.581) (-1.986) (-1.310) (-1.673) 
FOR_DUMMY 0.064** 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.120*** 0.070** 0.020 0.088* 
 (2.215) (3.108) (3.305) (3.742) (2.425) (0.506) (1.819) 
FOR_INCOME -0.432 -0.258 -0.246 -0.028 -0.039 0.127 -0.404 
 (-1.331) (-0.817) (-0.802) (-0.082) (-0.117) (0.223) (-0.700) 
LN_HAVENS 0.022 0.015 0.016 0.013 0.021 0.020 0.026 
 (1.485) (0.964) (1.097) (0.888) (1.335) (1.198) (1.356) 
TAX_FEES 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (1.161) (0.685) (0.686) (0.485) (0.573) (-0.348) (-0.120) 
LN_EMPLOYEES -0.405*** -0.416*** -0.409*** -0.414*** -0.395*** -0.702*** -0.797*** 
 (-8.572) (-9.491) (-9.483) (-7.705) (-7.363) (-8.015) (-6.950) 
SGA 0.056 0.056 0.050 0.051 0.094 -0.003 0.125 
 (0.992) (0.915) (0.833) (0.759) (1.303) (-0.019) (0.636) 
CEO_DELTA      -0.021*  
      (-1.950)  
CEO_AGE      -0.001  
      (-0.400)  
CFO_DELTA       -0.361*** 
       (-2.589) 
CFO_AGE       0.002 
       (1.032) 
Observations 42,450 44,385 46,416 38,385 32,700 16,269 12,628 
R-squared 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.161 0.161 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents the results of estimating OLS Regressions of tax department size (scaled by number of employees) on a set of tax avoidance 
incentives. All variables are calculated as described in Appendix A. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust 
and clustered by firm. T-statistics are presented in parantheses. *, **, and *** denote one-tailed (two-tailed) statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively, when a prediction is (not) made. 
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TABLE 4: The Relationship Between Tax Avoidance Incentives and Tax Department Investments 
 
Panel B: Hedge Fund Intervention and Analyst Cash Flow Forecast Initiation 
 
 Unadjusted Sample Entropy-Balanced Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INCENTIVE = Post Hedge Fund Post Cash Flow Forecast Post Hedge Fund Post Cash Flow Forecast 
     
INCENTIVE 0.096** 0.140*** 0.105** 0.097** 
 (1.706) (4.608) (1.811) (2.282) 
SIZE 0.236*** 0.101** 0.241** 0.132** 
 (3.207) (2.575) (2.189) (2.224) 
LN_SEGMENTS -0.117** -0.050 -0.104 -0.045 
 (-2.232) (-1.302) (-1.352) (-0.858) 
ROA -0.199 -0.073 0.048 -0.146* 
 (-1.398) (-1.323) (0.208) (-1.716) 
BTM -0.024 0.000 -0.024 -0.004 
 (-1.098) (0.066) (-0.979) (-0.234) 
FIRM_AGE 0.108*** 0.028*** 0.131*** 0.032*** 
 (4.106) (2.623) (3.683) (2.845) 
LEVERAGE -0.147 0.107 -0.029 0.056 
 (-1.116) (1.581) (-0.170) (0.435) 
PPE 0.430* 0.111 0.385 0.087 
 (1.872) (0.791) (1.262) (0.432) 
RD -0.580 -0.885*** -0.338 -1.011*** 
 (-1.294) (-3.679) (-0.516) (-2.650) 
INTANG -0.111 -0.095 0.016 -0.220 
 (-0.868) (-1.134) (0.091) (-1.516) 
INVENTORY 0.025 -0.122 0.162 -0.207 
 (0.073) (-0.669) (0.295) (-0.566) 
NOL 0.015 0.029 0.025 0.064** 
 (0.594) (1.498) (0.644) (2.158) 
CHANGE_NOL -0.088 -0.006 -0.074 0.021 
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TABLE 4, Panel B (Continued) 
 
 Unadjusted Sample Entropy-Balanced Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INCENTIVE = Post Hedge Fund Post Cash Flow Forecast Post Hedge Fund Post Cash Flow Forecast 
 (-1.149) (-0.217) (-0.785) (0.448) 
FOR_DUMMY 0.016 0.119*** 0.037 0.101** 
 (0.419) (3.732) (0.652) (2.348) 
FOR_INCOME 0.141 0.033 -0.176 -0.085 
 (0.252) (0.106) (-0.262) (-0.195) 
LN_HAVENS 0.020 0.032* 0.013 0.071** 
 (1.214) (1.864) (0.489) (2.194) 
TAX_FEES -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.001 
 (-0.420) (0.765) (-0.447) (0.165) 
LN_EMPLOYEES -0.678*** -0.328*** -0.783*** -0.380*** 
 (-7.893) (-7.188) (-5.929) (-6.560) 
SGA -0.020 -0.005 -0.142 -0.015 
 (-0.128) (-0.095) (-0.739) (-0.188) 
CEO_VEGA 0.151**  0.189  
 (2.514)  (1.424)  
CEO_DELTA -0.021**  -0.030  
 (-2.055)  (-1.430)  
LN_ANALYSTS  0.019  0.034 
  (1.086)  (1.379) 
     
Observations 16,617 40,073 16,617 40,073 
R-squared 0.161 0.071 0.169 0.146 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents the results of estimating Difference-in-Differences Regressions of tax department size (scaled by number of employees), using 
hedge fund interventions and analyst cash flow forecasts as the treatment event. All variables are calculated as described in Appendix A. Variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** 




TABLE 5: Differential Effects by Employee Type  
 
Panel A: Junior vs. Senior Employees 
Financial Constraints (Combined Measure) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable NUM JUNIOR NUM SENIOR 
INCENTIVE 0.011 0.038*** 
 (1.322) (3.691) 
Observations 32,700 32,700 
R-squared 0.047 0.061 
Controls & FEs YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM 
 
Equity Risk Incentives  
 
Hedge Fund Intervention 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable NUM JUNIOR NUM SENIOR 
INCENTIVE 0.010 0.085** 
 (0.222) (2.013) 
Observations 16,617 16,617 
R-squared 0.091 0.115 
Controls & FEs YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM 
 
Analyst Cash Flow Forecasts 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable NUM JUNIOR NUM SENIOR 
INCENTIVE 0.068*** 0.108*** 
 (2.827) (4.608) 
Observations 40,073 40,073 
R-squared 0.041 0.052 
Controls & FEs YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM 
 
 CEO Vega CFO Vega 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








INCENTIVE 0.018 0.028*** 0.022 0.029*** 
 (1.542) (2.734) (1.495) (2.612) 
Observations 16,269 16,269 12,628 12,628 
R-squared 0.091 0.115 0.090 0.115 
Controls & FEs YES YES YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM 
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TABLE 5: Differential Effects by Employee Type 
 
Panel B: Public Accounting vs. Tax Department Employees 
Financial Constraints (Combined Measure) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable NUM PUBLIC ACCT NUM TAX DEPT 
INCENTIVE 0.016 0.042*** 
 (1.472) (4.250) 
Observations 32,700 32,700 
R-squared 0.044 0.051 
Controls & FEs YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM 
 
Equity Risk Incentives 
 
 CEO Vega CFO Vega 











INCENTIVE 0.012 0.023** 0.018 0.031** 
 (1.031) (1.972) (1.303) (2.386) 
Observations 16,269 16,269 12,628 12,628 
R-squared 0.064 0.078 0.064 0.065 
Controls & FEs YES YES YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM 
 
Hedge Fund Intervention 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable NUM PUB ACCT NUM TAX DEPT 
INCENTIVE 0.055 0.109** 
 (1.232) (2.107) 
Observations 16,617 16,617 
R-squared 0.064 0.080 
Controls & FEs YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM 
 
Analyst Cash Flow Forecasts 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable NUM PUB ACCT NUM TAX DEPT 
INCENTIVE 0.077*** 0.082*** 
 (2.578) (3.079) 
Observations 40,073 40,073 
R-squared 0.036 0.043 
Controls & FEs YES YES 




TABLE 5: Differential Effects by Employee Type 
 
Panel C: Graduate Degree vs. Non-Graduate Degree Employees 
Financial Constraints (Combined Measure) 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable NUM NO GRAD NUM GRAD 
INCENTIVE 0.021** 0.041*** 
 (2.023) (3.822) 
Observations 32,700 32,700 
R-squared 0.027 0.049 
Controls & FEs YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM 
 
Equity Risk Incentives 
 
 CEO Vega CFO Vega 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








INCENTIVE 0.018 0.029*** 0.016 0.031*** 
 (1.505) (2.925) (1.528) (2.699) 
Observations 16,269 16,269 12,628 12,628 
R-squared 0.042 0.089 0.047 0.084 
Controls & FEs YES YES YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM 
 
Hedge Fund Intervention 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable NUM NO GRAD NUM GRAD 
INCENTIVE 0.109** 0.045 
 (2.208) (1.080) 
Observations 16,617 16,617 
R-squared 0.044 0.087 
Controls & FEs YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM 
 
Analyst Cash Flow Forecasts 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable NUM NO GRAD NUM GRAD 
INCENTIVE 0.098*** 0.070*** 
 (4.075) (2.769) 
Observations 40,073 40,073 
R-squared 0.019 0.043 
Controls & FEs YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM 
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TABLE 6: The Role of Tax Avoidance Incentive Shocks in Triggering Tax Department Hiring 
 
Panel A: Financial Constraints and Equity Risk Incentives 
 
 Financial Constraints Equity Risk Incentives 















        
INCENTIVE_SHOCK 0.105** 0.165*** 0.084** 0.061* 0.097** 0.073* 0.092* 
 (2.192) (3.403) (1.989) (1.420) (1.792) (1.326) (1.391) 
SIZE 0.296*** 0.338*** 0.326*** 0.252*** 0.297*** 0.125 -0.033 
 (3.378) (4.004) (4.135) (2.625) (2.638) (0.856) (-0.198) 
LN_SEGMENTS -0.055 -0.002 0.001 0.006 -0.020 0.075 0.038 
 (-0.556) (-0.018) (0.011) (0.057) (-0.171) (0.602) (0.231) 
ROA 0.042 0.067 0.084 0.100 0.090 -0.050 -0.127 
 (0.212) (0.348) (0.458) (0.473) (0.361) (-0.153) (-0.311) 
BTM -0.035 -0.031 -0.044* -0.038 -0.014 -0.098 -0.129* 
 (-1.360) (-1.173) (-1.748) (-1.231) (-0.441) (-1.581) (-1.845) 
FIRM_AGE -0.051* -0.035 -0.055** -0.059 -0.032 -0.011 -0.014 
 (-1.774) (-1.216) (-1.982) (-1.361) (-0.682) (-0.131) (-0.158) 
LEVERAGE -0.096 -0.056 -0.082 0.010 0.116 -0.386 -0.274 
 (-0.535) (-0.310) (-0.489) (0.052) (0.536) (-1.398) (-0.848) 
PPE -0.136 0.015 -0.044 -0.088 -0.122 -0.284 -0.481 
 (-0.379) (0.043) (-0.136) (-0.223) (-0.263) (-0.526) (-0.759) 
RD -2.106** -2.150** -2.412*** -1.903** -2.428** -1.749 -2.486 
 (-2.259) (-2.321) (-2.946) (-1.991) (-2.193) (-1.343) (-1.502) 
INTANG 0.932*** 1.036*** 1.089*** 1.036*** 1.072*** 1.354*** 0.640 
 (3.641) (4.160) (4.625) (3.816) (3.435) (3.569) (1.340) 
INVENTORY 0.492 0.620 0.833 0.198 0.334 1.347 0.317 
 (0.759) (0.998) (1.416) (0.299) (0.455) (1.437) (0.272) 
NOL 0.035 0.015 0.002 0.026 0.079 0.062 0.068 
 (0.622) (0.258) (0.032) (0.449) (1.190) (0.817) (0.743) 
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TABLE 6, Panel A (Continued) 
 
 Financial Constraints Equity Risk Incentives 















CHANGE_NOL 0.045 -0.087 0.024 0.032 -0.024 0.065 -0.099 
 (0.315) (-0.559) (0.175) (0.207) (-0.126) (0.251) (-0.319) 
FOR_DUMMY 0.194* 0.178* 0.215** 0.103 0.091 0.174 0.174 
 (1.913) (1.780) (2.252) (0.960) (0.755) (1.194) (0.961) 
FOR_INCOME -0.112 -0.236 -0.408 -0.035 0.928 0.352 2.342 
 (-0.131) (-0.270) (-0.502) (-0.037) (0.868) (0.292) (1.565) 
LN_HAVENS 0.041 0.051 0.039 0.055 0.075* 0.058 0.061 
 (1.070) (1.326) (1.074) (1.343) (1.687) (1.190) (1.021) 
TAX_FEES 0.018* 0.022** 0.016 0.014 0.021 0.019 0.053*** 
 (1.688) (2.075) (1.596) (1.167) (1.540) (1.263) (2.847) 
LN_EMPLOYEES 0.206** 0.195** 0.211** 0.155 0.067 0.272* 0.428*** 
 (2.259) (2.155) (2.496) (1.505) (0.552) (1.857) (2.722) 
SGA 0.842*** 0.976*** 0.900*** 0.699*** 0.961*** 0.592 0.399 
 (3.131) (3.959) (3.997) (2.765) (3.068) (1.383) (0.826) 
CEO_DELTA      -0.035  
      (-1.135)  
CEO_AGE      -0.014**  
      (-2.401)  
CFO_DELTA       -0.013 
       (-0.039) 
CFO_AGE       -0.007 
       (-1.000) 
Observations 20,855 20,982 23,822 18,519 14,642 11,067 7,877 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents the results of CFEL Regressions modeling the relationship between the probability of hiring a senior tax employee and large 
increases to tax avoidance incentives. Variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust SEs are clustered by firm. T-stats are presented in 
parantheses. *, **, and *** denote one-tailed (two-tailed) statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, when a prediction is (not) made. 
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TABLE 6: The Role of Tax Avoidance Incentive Shocks in Triggering Tax Department Hiring 
 
Panel B: Hedge Fund Intervention and Analyst Cash Flow Forecasts 
 
 (1) (2) 
INCENTIVE_SHOCK = Hedge Fund Initiation First CPS Forecast 
   
INCENTIVE_SHOCK 0.262** 0.184*** 
 (1.885) (2.526) 
SIZE 0.302** 0.377*** 
 (2.484) (4.275) 
LN_SEGMENTS 0.064 0.050 
 (0.558) (0.476) 
ROA 0.147 -0.152 
 (0.503) (-0.846) 
BTM -0.088 -0.053* 
 (-1.567) (-1.832) 
FIRM_AGE -0.065 -0.064* 
 (-0.782) (-1.823) 
LEVERAGE -0.283 0.005 
 (-1.173) (0.030) 
PPE -0.270 -0.257 
 (-0.555) (-0.712) 
RD -0.235 -2.394*** 
 (-0.204) (-2.932) 
INTANG 1.027*** 0.801*** 
 (3.050) (3.262) 
INVENTORY 0.907 0.172 
 (1.144) (0.274) 
NOL 0.070 -0.002 
 (1.011) (-0.037) 
CHANGE_NOL 0.129 0.085 
 (0.581) (0.592) 
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TABLE 6, Panel B (Continued) 
 
 (1) (2) 
INCENTIVE_SHOCK = Hedge Fund Initiation First CPS Forecast 
FOR_DUMMY 0.072 0.210** 
 (0.553) (2.215) 
FOR_INCOME -0.879 -0.716 
 (-0.779) (-0.833) 
LN_HAVENS 0.057 0.043 
 (1.282) (1.041) 
TAX_FEES 0.016 0.027** 
 (1.186) (2.473) 
LN_EMPLOYEES 0.212* 0.207** 
 (1.726) (2.172) 
SGA 0.813** 0.779*** 
 (2.231) (3.663) 
CEO_DELTA 0.003  
 (0.106)  
CEO_VEGA -0.034  
 (-0.180)  
LN_ANALYSTS  0.007 
  (0.146) 
   
Observations 12,853 20,085 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Note: This table presents the results of estimating Conditional Fixed Effect Logit Regressions modeling the relationship between the probability of 
hiring a senior tax employee and large increases to tax avoidance incentives. All variables are calculated as described in Appendix A. Variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
one-tailed (two-tailed) statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, when a prediction is (not) made.
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TABLE 7: The Relationship Between Tax Avoidance Incentives and Auditor-Provided Tax Service Fees  
 
Panel A: Firms without Tax Departments 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INCENTIVE = Financial 
Constraints 
CEO Vega CFO Vega Hedge Fund CF Forecasts 
      
INCENTIVE 0.070*** 0.171 -0.255 0.563** -0.054 
 (2.571) (0.534) (-1.044) (1.697) (-0.582) 
SIZE 0.126** 0.288 0.157 0.333 0.099** 
 (2.196) (1.332) (0.700) (1.549) (2.311) 
LN_SEGMENTS 0.318** -0.192 0.223 -0.161 0.260*** 
 (2.572) (-0.464) (0.450) (-0.408) (2.632) 
ROA 0.200** -0.170 0.401 -0.189 0.033 
 (2.496) (-0.447) (0.785) (-0.531) (0.624) 
BTM -0.036** 0.062 0.014 0.097 -0.024 
 (-2.162) (0.607) (0.094) (0.991) (-1.496) 
FIRM_AGE -0.039 -0.103 0.173 -0.156 -0.042 
 (-0.525) (-0.413) (0.740) (-0.618) (-0.857) 
LEVERAGE -0.208 -0.070 0.356 -0.243 -0.130 
 (-1.425) (-0.109) (0.458) (-0.394) (-1.220) 
PPE 0.012 -0.059 1.174 0.254 -0.010 
 (0.042) (-0.056) (0.997) (0.240) (-0.046) 
RD -0.067 -2.517** -1.892 -2.765** 0.051 
 (-0.202) (-2.165) (-0.855) (-2.301) (0.257) 
INTANG -0.013 0.613 0.814 0.759 0.039 
 (-0.062) (0.892) (1.324) (1.124) (0.227) 
INVENTORY -1.215*** -1.903 -1.677 -1.846 -0.766** 
 (-3.104) (-1.239) (-0.891) (-1.253) (-2.379) 
NOL 0.001 -0.227 -0.204 -0.214 -0.062 
 (0.016) (-1.203) (-0.918) (-1.156) (-1.112) 
CHANGE_NOL -0.013 0.043 0.099 0.035 -0.019 
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TABLE 7, Panel A (Continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INCENTIVE = Financial 
Constraints 
CEO Vega CFO Vega Hedge Fund CF Forecasts 
 (-0.345) (0.486) (0.988) (0.411) (-0.740) 
FOR_DUMMY -0.008 0.294 0.216 0.304 0.001 
 (-0.103) (1.325) (0.845) (1.414) (0.011) 
FOR_INCOME 0.429 -4.643 -3.825 -3.945 -0.396 
 (0.434) (-1.290) (-0.874) (-1.129) (-0.495) 
LN_HAVENS 0.036 0.033 0.121 0.028 0.034 
 (0.448) (0.197) (0.628) (0.173) (0.458) 
SGA 0.025 0.232 0.099 0.391 -0.145** 
 (0.251) (0.443) (0.132) (0.752) (-2.307) 
TOTAL_FEES 0.449*** 0.625** 1.301*** 0.633** 0.452*** 
 (11.236) (2.308) (5.351) (2.412) (13.386) 
Constant -5.649*** -8.320** -21.063*** -8.169** -5.548*** 
 (-7.200) (-2.020) (-5.961) (-2.057) (-10.298) 
      
Observations 14,748 1,819 1,259 1,859 21,387 
R-squared 0.170 0.244 0.256 0.247 0.171 
Other Controls N/A YES YES YES YES 
Firm FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM 
Note: This table presents the results of estimating Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of the logarithm of the dollar amount of tax service fees paid to 
the firm's auditor on a set of tax avoidance incentives, estimated for firms without tax departments. All variables are calculated as described in Appendix 
A. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote one-tailed (two-tailed) statistical 




 TABLE 7: The Relationship Between Tax Avoidance Incentives and Auditor-Provided Tax Service Fees  
 
Panel B: Firms with Tax Departments 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INCENTIVE = Financial 
Constraints 
CEO Vega CFO Vega Hedge Fund CF Forecasts 
      
INCENTIVE -0.071** 0.005 0.036 -0.025 0.000 
 (-1.781) (0.091) (0.378) (-0.217) (0.007) 
SIZE -0.115* 0.005 0.069 0.014 0.024 
 (-1.788) (0.056) (0.750) (0.168) (0.411) 
LN_SEGMENTS -0.095 -0.038 0.088 -0.040 -0.004 
 (-0.978) (-0.312) (0.666) (-0.326) (-0.039) 
ROA 0.105 0.256 0.319 0.227 -0.027 
 (0.806) (1.185) (1.311) (1.049) (-0.238) 
BTM 0.052** 0.034 0.025 0.033 0.022 
 (2.195) (0.849) (0.550) (0.839) (0.936) 
FIRM_AGE -0.114*** -0.029 0.018 -0.025 -0.094*** 
 (-2.886) (-0.475) (0.303) (-0.410) (-3.070) 
LEVERAGE 0.097 -0.019 -0.059 -0.011 -0.103 
 (0.595) (-0.079) (-0.227) (-0.046) (-0.689) 
PPE -0.020 0.532 0.990* 0.659 0.386 
 (-0.063) (1.062) (1.853) (1.317) (1.145) 
RD 0.000 0.316 0.624 0.328 0.185 
 (0.000) (0.347) (0.576) (0.356) (0.371) 
INTANG 0.401* 0.647** 0.395 0.579* -0.013 
 (1.724) (2.166) (1.198) (1.920) (-0.063) 
INVENTORY -1.522*** -1.589** -1.391* -1.520** -1.308** 
 (-2.680) (-2.186) (-1.736) (-2.076) (-2.435) 
NOL -0.031 -0.112* -0.051 -0.126* -0.019 
 (-0.583) (-1.648) (-0.703) (-1.855) (-0.347) 
CHANGE_NOL -0.162** -0.070 -0.035 -0.069 -0.077 
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TABLE 7, Panel B (Continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INCENTIVE = Financial 
Constraints 
CEO Vega CFO Vega Hedge Fund CF Forecasts 
 (-2.463) (-0.677) (-0.286) (-0.671) (-1.356) 
FOR_DUMMY -0.010 -0.255** -0.130 -0.218* -0.088 
 (-0.112) (-2.083) (-0.910) (-1.774) (-1.037) 
FOR_INCOME 0.488 0.862 0.216 0.842 1.300* 
 (0.649) (0.912) (0.217) (0.891) (1.779) 
LN_HAVENS 0.083** 0.073* 0.088* 0.070* 0.131*** 
 (2.092) (1.705) (1.859) (1.662) (3.228) 
SGA -0.080 0.484 0.560 0.491 -0.100 
 (-0.404) (1.513) (1.588) (1.549) (-0.629) 
TOTAL_FEES 0.976*** 1.100*** 1.166*** 1.076*** 0.987*** 
 (19.062) (16.607) (14.030) (16.566) (17.512) 
TAXDEPT_SIZE -0.017 -0.024 -0.008 -0.025 -0.012 
 (-0.838) (-0.753) (-0.234) (-0.803) (-0.689) 
Constant -10.721*** -15.132*** -16.930*** -14.786*** -12.089*** 
 (-12.995) (-11.506) (-11.676) (-11.511) (-15.756) 
      
Observations 20,969 14,103 11,211 14,393 22,964 
R-squared 0.236 0.304 0.228 0.304 0.252 
Other Controls N/A YES YES YES YES 
Firm FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM 
Note: This table presents the results of estimating Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of the logarithm of the dollar amount of tax service fees paid to 
the firm's auditor on a set of tax avoidance incentives, estimated for firms with tax departments. All variables are calculated as described in Appendix A. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote one-tailed (two-tailed) statistical 





TABLE 8: The Relationship Between Tax Avoidance Incentives and Tax-Motivated Lobbying  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INCENTIVE = Financial  
Constraints 
CEO Vega CFO Vega Hedge Fund CF Forecasts 
 
      
INCENTIVE 0.000 0.032*** 0.0399*** 0.005 0.015*** 
 (0.119) (3.777) (4.058) (0.275) (3.222) 
SIZE 0.060*** 0.115*** 0.123*** 0.120*** 0.045*** 
 (12.768) (11.007) (11.179) (11.836) (10.992) 
LN_SEGMENTS 0.015* 0.026* 0.024 0.025* 0.013** 
 (1.869) (1.840) (1.529) (1.782) (2.044) 
ROA -0.046*** -0.107*** -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.016*** 
 (-6.254) (-3.878) (-3.121) (-3.886) (-3.487) 
BTM -0.003* -0.012* -0.014 -0.013** -0.004*** 
 (-1.820) (-1.685) (-1.568) (-1.969) (-3.170) 
FIRM_AGE 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.000* 
 (6.208) (1.919) (1.372) (1.902) (1.826) 
LEVERAGE -0.025** -0.089*** -0.096*** -0.094*** -0.013 
 (-2.209) (-2.915) (-2.965) (-3.110) (-1.415) 
PPE -0.015 -0.021 -0.038 -0.023 -0.027* 
 (-0.748) (-0.438) (-0.704) (-0.487) (-1.774) 
RD -0.003 0.062 0.139 0.076 -0.007 
 (-0.137) (0.680) (1.334) (0.838) (-0.441) 
INTANG -0.093*** -0.225*** -0.232*** -0.230*** -0.069*** 
 (-5.081) (-5.905) (-5.730) (-6.047) (-4.794) 
INVENTORY -0.033 -0.152*** -0.183*** -0.160*** -0.052*** 
 (-1.409) (-2.642) (-2.923) (-2.813) (-2.861) 
NOL -0.011* -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 0.002 
 (-1.908) (-1.632) (-1.483) (-1.633) (0.467) 
CHANGE_NOL 0.002 0.009 0.020* 0.011 0.001 
 (0.798) (0.919) (1.828) (1.127) (0.832) 
FOR_DUMMY -0.030*** -0.015 -0.011 -0.015 -0.021*** 
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TABLE 8 (Continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
INCENTIVE = Financial  
Constraints 
CEO Vega CFO Vega Hedge Fund CF Forecasts 
 
 (-4.598) (-1.022) (-0.669) (-1.046) (-4.283) 
FOR_INCOME 0.224** 0.005 0.069 0.019 0.105 
 (2.081) (0.031) (0.416) (0.118) (1.156) 
LN_HAVENS 0.015*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 0.013*** 
 (2.685) (-1.563) (-1.444) (-1.445) (2.667) 
TAX_FEES 0.004*** 0.003 0.002 0.003* 0.002*** 
 (3.360) (1.508) (0.883) (1.689) (2.691) 
LN_EMPLOYEES -0.003 0.009 0.007 0.008 -0.000 
 (-0.664) (0.885) (0.696) (0.800) (-0.106) 
SGA 0.032*** 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.016*** 
 (4.205) (2.639) (2.707) (2.812) (3.456) 
Constant -0.323*** -0.538*** -0.591*** -0.656*** -0.233*** 
 (-5.087) (-3.660) (-3.686) (-4.915) (-7.677) 
      
Observations 35,538 15,907 12,460 16,236 43,797 
R-squared 0.238 0.340 0.347 0.337 0.152 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Clustered SE FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM 
Note: This table presents the results of estimating a linear probability model of the probability of tax-motivated lobbying on a set of tax avoidance 
incentives. All variables are calculated as described in Appendix A. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. T-statistics are presented in 




TABLE 9: Differential Effects Between Tax Avoiders and non-Tax Avoiders 
 
Panel A: Financial Constraints 
 
INCENTIVE = Altman’s Z-Score KZ Index WW Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Subsample Non Tax 
Avoiders 
Tax Avoiders Non Tax 
Avoiders 
Tax Avoiders Non Tax 
Avoiders 
Tax Avoiders 
INCENTIVE 0.037* 0.044** 0.054*** 0.027** 0.011 0.094** 
 (1.410) (1.911) (2.766) (1.788) (0.279) (2.336) 
Observations 18,476 18,764 19,493 19,658 20,600 20,607 
R-squared 0.110 0.088 0.098 0.097 0.086 0.110 
Controls & FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 










INCENTIVE = Textual Measure Combined Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Subsample  Non Tax Avoiders Tax Avoiders Non Tax Avoiders Tax Avoiders 
INCENTIVE 0.007 0.019* 0.029 0.075*** 
 (0.596) (1.591) (1.254) (3.694) 
Observations 16,735 16,743 14,083 14,287 
R-squared 0.093 0.088 0.075 0.116 
Controls & FEs YES YES YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM 
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TABLE 9: Differential Effects Between Tax Avoiders and non-Tax Avoiders 
 
Panel B: Equity Risk Incentives 
 
INCENTIVE = CEO Vega CFO Vega 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Subsample Non Tax Avoiders Tax Avoiders Non Tax Avoiders Tax Avoiders 
INCENTIVE 0.029* 0.048** -0.016 0.093*** 
 (1.735) (2.250) (-0.969) (3.178) 
Observations 7,808 7,767 5,972 6,015 
R-squared 0.162 0.169 0.163 0.173 
Controls & FEs YES YES YES YES 
Clustering FIRM FIRM FIRM FIRM 
 
Panel C: Hedge Fund Intervention 
 
 (1) (2) 
Treatment Group =  Non Tax Avoiders After Intervention Tax Avoiders After Intervention 
INCENTIVE 0.081 0.143** 
 (1.062) (1.806) 
Observations 16,617 16,617 
R-squared 0.160 0.161 
Controls & FEs YES YES 





TABLE 9: Differential Effects Between Tax Avoiders and non-Tax Avoiders 
 
Panel D: Analyst Cash Flow Forecast 
Note: These tables present the results of estimating OLS Regressions of tax department size (scaled by number of employees) on a set of 
tax avoidance incentives, where analyses are conducted separately on two equal-sized subsamples of tax avoiders and non tax avoiders. 
Each firm is categorized into one of the two groups based on the sensitivity of the firm's cash effective tax rates (Cash ETR) to changes in 
the incentives (computed using simple correlations or comparisons of Cash ETR pre- and post- treatment). All variables are calculated as 
described in Appendix A. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. T-
statistics are presented in parantheses. *, **, and *** denote one-tailed (two-tailed) statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 




 (1) (2) 
Treatment Group = Non Tax Avoiders After Forecast Tax Avoiders After Forecast 
INCENTIVE 0.032 0.152*** 
 (0.813) (3.591) 
Observations 40,073 40,073 
R-squared 0.069 0.070 
Controls & FEs YES YES 
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